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The Economics of Managerial Taxes  
and Corporate Risk-Taking 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: We examine the relation between managers’ personal income tax rates and their 
corporate investment decisions. Using plausibly exogenous variation in federal and state tax 
rates, we find a positive relation between managers’ personal tax rates and their corporate risk-
taking. Moreover—and consistent with our theoretical predictions—we find that this relation is 
stronger among firms with investment opportunities that have a relatively high rate of return per 
unit of risk, and stronger among CEOs who have a relatively low marginal disutility of risk. 
Importantly, our results are unique to senior managers’ tax rates––we do not find similar 
relations for middle-income tax rates. We also find that the tax-induced risk-taking relates to 
idiosyncratic rather than systematic risk, suggesting that it will not be priced by well-diversified 
shareholders. Collectively, our findings provide evidence that managers’ personal income taxes 
influence their corporate risk-taking. 
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1. Introduction 
 Fiscal policy—and taxation in particular—is one of the most important tools that 
policymakers can use to influence the economy. While the effect of corporate taxes on 
managers’ corporate investment decisions has been extensively studied, little is known about the 
effect of managers’ personal taxes on their corporate investment decisions (see Shackelford and 
Shevlin, 2001; Graham, 2003; Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010 for reviews of the corporate tax 
literature). We aim to fill this gap by examining the relation between personal income taxes 
levied directly on senior managers, hereafter “managerial taxes,” and their corporate risk-taking. 
In this regard, we relate taxes on corporate decision-makers to their corporate decisions. Given 
their unique position as primary decision-makers at the firm, understanding whether and how 
taxes on senior managers affect corporate decisions has important implications for fiscal policy. 
As Hall and Liebman (2000, 2) note: “[T]op executives manage assets worth billions of dollars, 
their compensation arrangements and the incentives they face are of substantial importance to 
the performance of the U.S. economy ... their responsiveness to taxation has important revenue 
and efficiency implications.” 
 The intuition for how taxes affect managers’ real investment decisions is similar to how 
taxes affect shareholders’ personal investment decisions (e.g., Domar and Musgrave, 1944; 
Mossin, 1968; Stiglitz, 1969; Poterba and Samwick, 2002). In particular, taxes facilitate risk-
sharing with the government. By reducing the disutility that a risk-averse manager associates 
with risky investments, taxes increase their incentive (or, equivalently, reduce their disincentive) 
to take risk. We use a simple theoretical framework to formalize the intuition that risk-averse 
managers who face different tax rates, but who are otherwise identical (i.e., have the same level 
of risk aversion, pre-tax compensation, equity holdings, and corporate investment opportunities) 
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will make different investment decisions; and we use the insights from this framework to inform 
the design of our empirical tests.1 
 We empirically examine the relation between the tax rate on senior managers and 
corporate risk-taking using exogenous variation in federal and state statutory income tax rates. 
We measure a manager’s marginal income tax rate using the combined statutory tax rate for the 
top federal and state income bracket assuming that the manager works in the state of the firm’s 
headquarters, and measure corporate risk-taking using research and development (e.g., Coles, 
Daniel, and Naveen, 2006; Gormley, Matsa, and Milbourn, 2013).2 A key advantage of this 
measure of corporate risk-taking is that it is directly controllable by senior managers, and it is not 
mechanically related to trading activity in capital markets, disclosure, or taxes on shareholders 
(e.g., capital gains taxes). Nevertheless, to ensure that our inferences are not unique to a specific 
measure of risk-taking, in subsequent analyses we confirm that our results are robust to using 
earnings volatility and idiosyncratic return volatility as additional measures of risk-taking. 
 We test for a relation between managerial taxes and corporate risk-taking using multiple 
distinct sets of tests that exploit different sources of exogenous variation in managerial taxes. 
Our first set of tests consists of a between-group analysis that relies on comparisons between 
time periods, states, and firms. These tests estimate the relation between managerial taxes and 
corporate risk-taking using all of the variation in managerial taxes, regardless of its source (i.e., 
federal or state, cross-sectional or time-series). Consistent with our theoretical predictions, we 
find a positive relation between managerial taxes and corporate risk-taking. This relation is 
                                                 
1 We use the term “manager” or “senior manager” to describe our predictions rather than CEO, because theory 
suggests the effects we document to generalize to any manager who (i) is risk-averse, (ii) faces a fixed marginal tax 
rate, (iii) is paid a share of the project outcome, and (iv) has decision rights in selecting the riskiness of the project. 
See Section 2 for more details. 
2 Regardless of firm performance, we find that the base salary of nearly all CEOs in our sample is sufficient to put 
them in the top bracket. 
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robust to controlling for a battery of time-varying firm characteristics (e.g., size, performance, 
and growth opportunities), managerial characteristics (e.g., tenure, age, and equity incentives), 
and state characteristics (e.g., local economic growth, corporate taxes, and political affiliation of 
the local legislature).  
 Our second set of tests consists of a within-group analysis that relies on comparisons 
within a given time period, state, firm, or manager. The primary advantage of these tests is that 
they help alleviate concerns that our results are attributable to omitted firm characteristics (e.g., 
industry and governance practices), manager characteristics (e.g., “managerial style”), state 
characteristics (e.g., geographic location and availability of natural resources), or common 
macroeconomic shocks or time trends. One potential disadvantage of these tests is that by 
controlling for common temporal variation, they necessarily eliminate all of the variation in taxes 
at the federal level. These tests estimate the relation between managerial taxes and corporate 
risk-taking using only state-level variation in managerial taxes. Despite the resulting reduction in 
power, we continue to find that managerial taxes are positively related to corporate risk-taking.  
 In our third set of tests, we examine settings where our theoretical framework predicts the 
effect of managerial taxes will be particularly strong. Specifically, theory suggests that the 
positive relation between managerial taxes and corporate risk-taking is stronger among firms 
with investment opportunities that have a high rate of return per unit of risk, and among 
managers who have a relatively low marginal disutility of risk. The intuition for these predictions 
is that in the former (latter) circumstance, the marginal benefit (marginal cost) of risk is 
relatively high (low). The higher the marginal benefit (or the lower the marginal cost), the 
greater the amount of risk that is taken; and the greater the amount of risk that is taken, the 
greater the benefit to sharing risk with the government. Consistent with these predictions, we 
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find that the relation is stronger in industries where the investment opportunity set provides a 
relatively high rate of return per unit of risk and for Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) who have a 
relatively low marginal disutility of risk. By linking the relation between managerial taxes and 
corporate risk-taking to characteristics of the firm and CEO, these findings strengthen our 
inference that the relation is attributable to the decisions of senior managers (as opposed to mid-
level managers or investors). 
 Finally, we conduct an extensive battery of sensitivity tests. First, we repeat our primary 
tests including the middle-income tax rate as an additional control. By holding the middle-
income rate fixed, the residual variation in senior managers’ tax rate captures the difference, or 
“wedge,” between the rate paid by senior managers and the rate paid by middle-income earners. 
To the extent that an omitted variable (e.g., a state-level economic shock) equally affects both 
rates, this analysis also controls for these omitted variables. We continue to find that the tax rate 
on senior managers is related to corporate risk-taking, and no evidence of an incremental relation 
between middle-income rates and corporate risk-taking. These findings suggest that the relation 
between managerial taxes and corporate risk-taking is not attributable to personal income taxes 
in general, but rather is specific to the tax rate on senior managers. Although we cannot 
definitively rule out the possibility of a correlated omitted variable, to explain our collective 
results an omitted variable would have to be (i) correlated with corporate risk-taking, (ii) vary 
systematically with firms’ investment opportunity sets and CEOs’ marginal disutility to risk, and 
(iii) cause a difference in the rates between senior managers and middle-income earners. 
Second, we examine the relation between managerial taxes and three alternative 
outcome-based measures of risk-taking: earnings volatility, idiosyncratic return volatility, and 
systematic return volatility. The distinction between idiosyncratic and systematic volatility is 
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important. Diversified shareholders are risk neutral (risk averse) with respect to idiosyncratic 
(systematic) risk. If managers were to take more systematic risk, shareholders would be directly 
affected and might seek to prevent this behavior. In contrast, if managers were to take more 
idiosyncratic risk, then shareholders would be less inclined to discourage this behavior since 
idiosyncratic risk is diversifiable and shareholders want managers to adopt all positive net 
present value projects regardless of idiosyncratic risk (Armstrong and Vashishtha, 2012). 
Consequently, in equilibrium, we expect managerial taxes to primarily affect firms’ idiosyncratic 
rather than systematic risk. We find evidence of a positive relation between managerial taxes and 
both earnings volatility and idiosyncratic return volatility, but no evidence of a relation with 
systematic return volatility. The notion that managers’ tax-induced risk-taking is diversifiable 
potentially explains the puzzling findings in prior literature that boards—acting on behalf of 
shareholders—do not alter managers’ incentive-compensation contracts in response to changes in 
personal tax rates (e.g., Goolsbee, 2000; Hall and Liebman, 2000; Frydman and Molloy, 2011). 
Our collective results provide evidence that managers’ personal taxes can and do affect their 
corporate investment decisions.   
Our research question and findings should be of interest to policymakers, boards, and 
academics. With respect to policymakers, our work adds to the large public finance literature on 
the responses to taxation. Although a complete accounting of all the benefits and costs of tax 
policy is beyond the scope of any single study, understanding the various margins of response to 
taxation is at the heart of optimal tax policy. We contribute to this literature by documenting a 
previously unidentified margin of response to personal taxation—namely, corporate risk-taking. 
Insofar as the effects that we document are attributable to the top personal income tax rate on 
senior managers and not the tax rate on middle-income employees (or middle-income 
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shareholders), they potentially represent a heretofore overlooked externality of changes in the top 
personal income tax rate. Changes in the top personal income tax rate cause a shift in corporate 
resources toward high risk projects which can affect lower-level employees and other corporate 
stakeholders who are not directly subject to the tax. 
With respect to boards, our findings suggest that personal income taxes can alter the 
disutility that senior managers associate with corporate risk-taking, and thus directly affect their 
real investment decisions. While our empirical results suggest that any tax-induced risk-taking is 
diversifiable, or idiosyncratic, to the extent that shareholders are undiversified, boards might 
want to consider how taxation affects managerial risk-taking incentives. 
Finally, with respect to academics, our study contributes to the large literature on 
managerial risk-taking. Numerous prior studies have sought to link managerial compensation and 
corporate risk-taking, but in doing so have largely ignored the role of taxation (e.g., Lambert, 
Larcker, and Verrecchia, 1991; Guay, 1999; Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Coles et al., 2006; 
Armstrong and Vashishtha, 2012). We add to this literature by showing that managers’ personal 
income taxes have a measurable effect on corporate risk-taking. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides some simple 
numerical examples that illustrate the effect of income taxes on a manager’s selection of risky 
projects. Section 3 reviews the personal tax treatment of common forms of managerial 
compensation and discusses the contributions of our study relative to prior literature. Section 4 
describes our sample and measurement choices. Section 5 presents our results, and Section 6 
provides concluding remarks. 
 
2. Hypothesis Development 
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 The intuition for how personal income taxes affect managers’ choice of risky projects is 
quite general and is similar to how taxes affect shareholders’ choice of personal investments 
(e.g., Mossin, 1968; Stiglitz, 1969). In this section, we illustrate the intuition with a series of 
simple numerical examples in which we assume a fixed marginal tax rate and an exogenous set 
of investment opportunities. In order to focus on the most fundamental and general intuition, we 
deliberately abstract away from complex issues concerning progressive tax rates, moral hazard, 
and adverse selection. We refer the interested reader to Fellingham and Wolfson (1985), 
Katuscak (2009), Niemann (2008), and Krenn (2016) for a formal treatment of these issues in the 
context of managerial taxes.  
2.1. Benchmark case of project selection 
 Consider a manager who faces a choice between two mutually exclusive projects that 
differ in their payoffs to the manager, but are otherwise identical. Both projects have two 
potential outcomes that occur with equal likelihood. Project A pays the manager $4 in the bad 
state and $5 in the good state. Project B pays the manager $3.25 in the bad state and $7.75 in the 
good state. The payoffs are as follows: 
Project A 
Prob. Payoff
1/2 $4.00 
1/2 $5.00 
μ(A) $4.50 
σ2(A) $0.25  
Project B 
Prob. Payoff
1/2 $3.25 
1/2 $7.75 
μ(B) $5.50 
σ2(B) $5.06  
where μ(i) denotes the expected payoff of project i and σ2(i)  denotes the variance of the payoff to 
project i. A manager’s choice between these projects depends on whether he is risk-neutral or 
risk-averse. 
Risk-Neutral Manager. If the manager is risk-neutral, he is indifferent towards risk, σ2, and 
simply chooses the project with the highest expected payoff, μ, which corresponds to Project B.  
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Risk-Averse Manager. If the manager is risk-averse, his choice will depend on how he trades off 
the risk, σ2, and the reward, μ, of the two projects. Without additional assumptions about the 
manager’s preferences (i.e., utility function), it is not possible to determine which project he will 
choose.  
 Consider a risk-averse manager who has mean-variance utility of the form: 
 U(μ, σ2) = α μ(i)  – β σ2(i) (1) 
where α > 0 and β > 0 are arbitrary fixed parameters. Mean-variance utility is a parsimonious 
way to formalize the notion that a risk-averse manager likes projects that have greater expected 
payoffs, μ(i), and dislikes projects with more risk, or variance, σ2(i).3 Here, β represents the 
manager’s risk-aversion: higher β implies greater disutility per unit of variance. Thus, the 
manager’s choice between Project A and B depends on the parameters α and β. For example, if α 
= 1 and β = 0.3, the manager’s utility from adopting Project A is 4.43 (4.5 – 0.3 x 0.25), and his 
utility from adopting Project B is 3.98 (5.5 – 0.3 x 5.06). In this case, the manager will choose 
Project A.  
2.2. Effect of taxes on project selection 
 Now consider how taxes affect the manager’s project selection. Suppose that the manager 
is subject to a 40% tax. Taxes have two effects on a risk-averse manager. First, they alter the 
expected payoff by a factor of (1 – t), or 0.6 in this case. Second, they alter the risk the manager 
associates with the project by a factor of (1 – t)2, or 0.36 in this case. When the manager faces a 
tax rate of 40%, his utility from adopting Project A is 2.67 (0.6 x 4.5 – 0.3 x 0.36 x 0.25), and his 
                                                 
3 Our choice of a mean-variance utility function is motivated by the mean-variance certainty equivalent 
representation that is common in agency models. For example, setting α = 1 and β = ρ/2 in Eq. (1) corresponds to the 
special case of negative exponential utility (i.e., CARA) with normally distributed payoffs, where ρ is the manager’s 
coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Another way to derive a mean-variance representation is to assume power 
utility (i.e., CRRA) coupled with payoffs that follow a lognormal distribution. For simplicity, we assume that the 
manager’s preferences have a mean-variance representation. This representation does not require any assumptions 
about the distribution of payoffs. 
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utility from adopting Project B is 2.75 (0.6 x 5.5 – 0.3 x 0.36 x 5.06). Consequently, in the 
presence of taxes, the risk-averse manager will now choose Project B, which is the riskier 
project.  
 To see how these two effects manifest in the manager’s utility function, note that we can 
rewrite the utility function as follows: 
 U(μ, σ2) = α (1 – t) μ(i)  – β (1 – t)2 σ2(i) (2) 
The first term, α(1 – t), represents the reduction in the manager’s expected payoff, and the 
second term, β(1 – t)2, represents the reduction in the disutility that the risk-averse manager 
associates with risky projects. The higher the tax rate, t, the larger the reduction in disutility a 
risk-averse manager associates with risky projects. Eq. (2) illustrates how two risk-averse 
managers who face different income tax rates––but who are otherwise identical––will evaluate 
risk differently. To demonstrate that this intuition is not an artifact of the specific parameter 
values, we next solve for the optimal project as a function of the tax rate, the parameters of the 
investment opportunity set, and the parameters of the manager’s utility function. 
2.3. Taxes with a continuum of projects 
 It is straightforward to extend our simple example from a choice between two projects to 
a choice from a continuum of projects. To do so, we must first specify the set of available 
projects, or investment opportunities, in mean-variance space. Let the set of available projects be 
given by a concave efficient frontier (e.g., Sharpe, 1964) that takes the form: 
 μ(i) = φ + θ  log(1 + σ2(i))  (3) 
where log(.) is the natural log operator, and φ represents the payoff to the risk-free project where 
σ2(i) = 0, and θ determines the slope of the frontier. A concave efficient frontier captures the 
notion that to increase the expected payoff, the manager must accept increasingly more risk. 
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Figure 1 plots the frontier for φ = 5, θ = 1 in blue. The y-axis (x-axis) is the expected pre-tax 
payoff (variance).  
 Substituting Eq. (3) into Eq. (2) and maximizing the manager’s utility over the choice of 
σ2(i) yields the following first-order-condition: 
     01
)(1
1 22 



 tit 
  (4)  
Re-arranging to solve for the risk of the optimal project, σ2(i*), yields: 
 1
1
*)(2 





t
i 
  (5) 
provided α θ ≥ β (1 – t), and 0 otherwise. If this inequality is not satisfied, the marginal benefit of 
risk is strictly less than the marginal cost (expressed in “utils”) and there is no interior solution: it 
is never optimal to take any risk and the manager will always choose the risk-free project. 
Because this scenario is not empirically descriptive, for the remainder of the paper, we assume 
the existence of an interior solution (i.e., the optimal level of risk-taking is strictly positive). Eq. 
(5) shows that, provided there is an interior solution, the risk of the optimal project is 
unambiguously increasing in the tax rate, i.e., 0*)(
2


t
i .  
 Figure 1 plots the manager’s indifference curves for tax rates t = 0 and t = 0.4 in solid red 
and dashed red, respectively (assuming α = 1 and β = 0.3 as in our earlier example). Figure 1 
illustrates that, as taxes increase, the slope of the indifference curve shifts downward––the 
manager associates less disutility with risk and, consequently, is willing to select riskier projects. 
Figure 1 shows that by reducing the disutility associated with a given level of risk, taxes reduce 
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the slope of the manager’s indifference curve and, in turn, cause the manager to select a riskier 
project.4  
2.4. Cross-sectional predictions 
 In addition to illustrating how taxes affect a manager’s choice of risky projects, our 
simple example also illustrates that the effect of taxes on risk-taking depends on specific 
characteristics of the firm and the manager. The general intuition behind these predictions is that 
the effect of taxes on risk-taking is stronger when either the marginal benefit of risk is high or the 
marginal cost of risk is low.  
2.4.1. Marginal benefit of risk 
 Eq. (5) shows that the effect of taxes on the risk of the optimal project is increasing in the 
slope of the firm’s investment opportunity set, 0*)(
22




t
i . In other words, t and θ are 
complements. For two levels of θ, θHigh > θLow,, the effect of taxes is larger in the former 
circumstance.  
Hight
i  
 *)(2     >   Lowt
i  
 *)(2  
 
The intuition for this result is that θ measures the marginal benefit to risk-taking. The higher the 
marginal benefit, the greater the amount of risk that is taken; and because more risk is taken, the 
manager derives greater benefit from sharing risk with the government. 
 Panel A of Figure 2 plots the investment frontier for θ = 1.6 in blue and the manager’s 
indifference curves for tax rates t = 0 and t = 0.4 in solid red and dashed red, respectively 
(assuming α = 1 and β = 0.3 as in Figure 1). As before, Panel A shows that taxes cause the slope 
                                                 
4 It is important to note that this does not imply that the manager is better off. Indeed, the manager is strictly worse 
off. For t = 0, the utility-maximizing project yields utility of 6.90, whereas for t = 0.4, the utility-maximizing project 
yields utility of 4.52. 
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of the indifference curve to shift downward. However, because the slope of the investment 
opportunity set is steeper relative to Figure 1, the point of tangency entails a greater increase in 
risk-taking. 
2.4.2. Marginal cost of risk 
 Eq. (5) shows that the effect of taxes on the risk of the optimal project is decreasing in the 
manager’s risk aversion, 0*)(
22




t
i . In other words, t and β are substitutes. That is, for two 
levels of β, βHigh > βLow,, the effect of taxes is smaller in the former circumstance.  
 Hight
i  
 *)(2    <   Lowt
i  
 *)(2     
The intuition for this result is that β measures the marginal cost, or disutility, to risk-taking. The 
higher the marginal cost, the lower the amount of risk that is taken, and the less valuable it is to 
share risk with the government. 
 Panel B of Figure 2 plots the manager’s indifference curves for tax rates t = 0 and t = 0.4 
in solid red and dashed red, respectively, assuming α = 1 and β = 0.6, and the frontier in blue (for 
θ = 1 as in Figure 1). Because the manager is more risk-averse, the slope of the indifference 
curve is steeper. As before, Panel B shows that taxes still cause the slope of the indifference 
curve to shift downward. However, because the manager is more risk-averse (relative to Figure 
1), the downward shift in slope is less than before, and the point of tangency entails a smaller 
increase in risk-taking. Thus, when the marginal disutility of risk is high (low) taxes provide less 
(more) of an incentive to take risk. 
 One important empirical consideration is that it is inherently difficult to measure 
managers’ risk aversion. Consequently, it is necessarily difficult to test such a prediction. 
However, the same prediction also applies to the sensitivity of the manager’s compensation to 
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performance, where the latter is a theoretical construct that is relatively more amenable to 
empirical tests (e.g., Core and Guay, 2002). To see that the same predictions apply, note that the 
utility function of a manager who is compensated with a δ-share of the project outcome, where δ 
> 0, is given by:  
 U(μ, σ2) = α (1 – t) δ μ(i)  – β (1 – t)2 δ2 σ2(i) (6) 
Note that we previously assumed that δ = 1, which corresponds to the special case in which the 
manager receives the entire payoff.  
 Borrowing terminology from Ross (2004), Eq. (6) shows that δ “magnifies” both the risk 
and the reward of the project: expected compensation increases by a factor of δ and the variance 
increases by a factor of δ2. It is easy to verify that the risk of the optimal project is now given by: 
 1
1
1*)(2 





t
i 
  (7) 
Eq. (7) shows that the manager’s risk aversion, β, and the sensitivity of the manager’s 
compensation to project outcome, δ, operate in exactly the same manner. The intuition for this 
result is that just like β, higher values of δ correspond to a greater marginal disutility of risk (see 
related discussions in Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia, 1991; Ross, 2004; and Armstrong, 
Larcker, Ormazabal, and Taylor, 2013).5 As before, when the marginal disutility of risk is high, 
taxes provide less of an incentive to take risk. Thus, for two levels of δ, δ High > δ Low,, the effect 
of taxes is smaller in the former circumstance.  
Hight
i  
 *)(2    <   Lowt
i  
 *)(2     
                                                 
5 Consistent with this theoretical result, CEOs whose equity portfolios are more sensitive to changes in stock price 
have greater marginal disutility of risk and have been shown to take less risk (e.g., Coles et al., 2006; Armstrong and 
Vashishtha, 2012). 
 14
This comparative static provides a prediction that is more amenable to empirical tests than does 
the analogous comparative static based on the manager’s risk aversion (which is unobservable). 
2.5. Discussion 
 In this section, we discuss four caveats that apply to our simple framework. 
 Risk-Neutral Manager. Our analysis assumes that the manager is risk-averse and has 
preferences that can be approximated with mean-variance utility. If the manager is risk-neutral, 
he will select the project with the highest expected after-tax payoff (μ), regardless of its risk. In 
this case, taxes will not influence his risk-taking decision. The intuition for this result is that risk-
neutral managers only care about expected after-tax payoffs and a fixed marginal tax rate does 
not affect the ordering of projects when ranked according to after-tax payoffs. Thus, we expect 
our predictions to be empirically descriptive only insofar as managers are risk-averse and mean-
variance utility sufficiently approximates their preferences.6 
 Fixed marginal tax rate. One of the key assumptions in our analysis is that the manager’s 
marginal tax rate is not affected by the project’s outcome (i.e., the manager’s tax rate is fixed). 
For a manager’s tax rate to vary with project outcome, the outcome would have to cause the 
manager to shift to a different tax bracket. In our sample, we find that the 97% of CEOs are in 
the highest tax bracket based on their salaries alone. Moreover, we find no evidence that poor 
accounting or stock performance is related to their tax bracket.7 These findings not only validate 
our assumption of a fixed marginal tax rate, but also contrast sharply with the marginal corporate 
tax rate and capital gains tax rates which vary with performance (e.g., vary for gains or losses). 
Admittedly, if the manager’s marginal income tax rate varies with performance then, similar to 
                                                 
6 Feldstein (1969) and Stiglitz (1969) show that although this intuition does not generalize to all classes of utility 
functions, it holds for common utility functions that exhibit constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) and constant 
relative risk aversion (CRRA). 
7 We report and discuss this analysis in detail in Table IA.1 of the Internet Appendix. 
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the corporate rate, managerial taxes could potentially lead to decreased risk-taking (e.g., 
Fellingham and Wolfson, 1985; Auerbach, 1986; Ljungqvist, Zhang, and Zuo, 2017). We view 
this possibility as adding tension to our empirical analysis.  
 Partial equilibrium. Our simple framework is inherently a partial equilibrium analysis; 
we do not model how shareholders adjust managers’ incentive-compensation contracts in 
response to tax rates (see Katuscak, 2009; Niemann, 2008; and Krenn, 2016 for examples of such 
models). Although this would seem to be a limitation of our simple framework, an extensive 
body of empirical literature finds limited evidence that shareholders adjust managers’ incentive-
compensation contracts in response to changes in personal income tax rates (see related literature 
described in Section 3.2).8 While this remains an ongoing puzzle in the empirical literature, it 
does seem to suggest that a simple framework that ignores recontracting may nevertheless be 
empirically descriptive (and perhaps more descriptive than a framework predicated on 
recontracting). One potential explanation for the absence of recontracting is that, empirically, we 
find that tax-induced risk-taking is exclusively idiosyncratic in nature. Idiosyncratic risk is 
diversifiable––and thus not priced by diversified shareholders. Consequently, shareholders will 
be less inclined to alter managers’ incentive-compensation contracts following a change in 
personal tax rates than they would if the risk-taking entailed non-diversifiable risk (i.e., 
systematic risk).  
 Performance Pay and Decision Rights. Our simple framework assumes that the 
manager’s compensation varies with project performance (i.e., δ > 0) and that the manager has 
decision rights in selecting the riskiness of the project. In this regard, our results generalize to 
senior managers beyond the CEO. However, we caution that our results are not likely to 
                                                 
8 This finding is also consistent with a large literature that finds that shareholders generally appear reluctant to 
recontract with managers or debtholders, even when it would seem to be in their interest to do so (see Armstrong, 
Guay, and Weber, 2010 for a review). 
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generalize to (lower-level) employees who do not receive a fraction of the payoff from the 
project or who do not have decision rights regarding project selection. 
 Horizon vs. Volatility. Our predictions relate to the volatility of cash flows rather than the 
horizon of cash flows. These are distinct concepts. Horizon refers to the timing of a project’s 
cash flows and does not necessarily correspond to volatility. For example, a 30-year Treasury 
bond is an investment with a relatively long horizon but with relatively low cash flow volatility. 
Although our analysis does not preclude an effect of taxes on managers’ horizon, formally 
examining this concept is beyond the scope of our simple framework. The results from any such 
extension would depend on how the relation between horizon and cash flow volatility is 
parameterized. For example, if short- (long-) horizon projects are more volatile from the 
manager’s perspective, then taxes could potentially lead the manager to select shorter- (longer-) 
horizon projects. 
 
3. Institutional Background and Related Literature 
3.1. Personal taxation of managerial compensation 
 Consistent with prior literature, we adopt an expansive definition of compensation that 
includes not only a manager’s “flow pay” (e.g., salary, bonus, new equity grants, etc.), but also 
the change in the value of his existing equity holdings. Appendix A provides a synopsis of the 
federal income tax treatment of stock options, stock appreciation rights, restricted stock, 
unrestricted stock, pensions, and salary, bonus, and long-term incentive plans. Most states follow 
the federal tax treatment.9 
                                                 
9 Pennsylvania taxes all stock options as non-qualified stock options. Hawaii and Rhode Island do not tax option 
grants to employees of certain qualified companies. 
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 Two institutional features of the taxation of managerial compensation inform the design 
of our empirical tests. First, all forms of managerial compensation are taxed as ordinary income 
at the time the compensation is either received (salary, bonus, and long-term incentive plans), 
vested (restricted stock), or exercised (stock options and stock appreciation rights). This means 
that the entire value of the portfolio is taxed at the prevailing personal income rate at the time it 
is received, vested, or exercised. Second, any appreciation in value between the vesting/exercise 
date and the date the shares are sold is also taxed as ordinary income, unless the shares are sold 
more than twelve months after vesting/exercise.10 Only appreciation in the value of unrestricted 
stock that is sold more than twelve months after vesting/exercise is not subject to ordinary 
income tax and is instead taxed at the long-term capital gains rate. Thus, the vast majority of a 
manager’s compensation and equity portfolio is taxed at the prevailing ordinary income rate. For 
example, Jin and Kothari (2008) estimate that if the average CEO were to sell all of his vested 
equity, the capital gains tax burden would only be 2% of the value of the vested equity.11 
Assuming a 20% long-term capital gains tax rate, their estimate implies that only 10% of the 
value of the average CEO’s vested equity would be subject to long-term capital gains tax.  
 Given these two features of the taxation of managerial compensation, we focus our 
empirical analysis on managers’ income tax rate rather than the long-term capital gains tax rate. 
This is not to suggest that the long-term capital gains rate is not relevant for managers’ risk-
taking decisions, but rather that capital gains taxes are not necessary to give rise to the effects 
that we predict and find. Because states generally tax capital gains and ordinary income at the 
same rate, prior work on capital gains taxes focuses primarily on capital gains taxes at the federal 
                                                 
10 For example, if a manager exercises options and sells the shares acquired from the exercise during the subsequent 
twelve months, no long-term capital gains are generated from either the grant, exercise, or sale. Instead, everything 
will be taxed at the prevailing personal income tax rate. 
11 See Jin and Kothari (2008) Table 1 and Table B1.  
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level (e.g., Dhaliwal, Krull, and Li, 2007; Campbell, Chyz, Dhaliwal, and Schwartz, 2013).12 In 
this regard, an important feature of our research design is the inclusion of time period effects, 
which control for the prevailing federal long-term capital gains rate in a given year.    
3.2. Related literature on managerial taxes  
 We conjecture that tax rates on senior managers affect corporate risk-taking incremental 
to the effect of such taxes on compensation and equity incentives. We refer to this as the “direct 
effect” of taxes on risk-taking decisions. However, boards might also alter managers’ incentive-
compensation contracts, or managers might adjust their equity holdings, in response to tax 
changes. These would represent a separate “indirect effect” of taxes on risk-taking decisions. 
Figure 2 illustrates these two channels.  
 Prior literature focuses exclusively on the latter channel and finds limited evidence of 
changes in managers’ incentive-compensation contracts and equity holding in response to 
changes in the manager’s tax rate. This suggests that the indirect effect is muted. For example, 
Hall and Liebman (2000) use variation in the top federal income tax rate between 1980 to 1994 
to examine the relation between managers’ tax rates and managerial compensation. During their 
sample period, the top federal income tax rate fell from 70% to 42.5%. Hall and Liebman (2000, 
42) find no evidence of a relation between taxes and either the amount or the form of managers’ 
compensation and conclude that “attempts to use tax policy to influence executive compensation 
have had little effect”. Frydman and Molloy (2011) use data on the top federal income tax rate 
from 1946 to 2005 to examine a similar question. Despite substantial variation in tax rates during 
                                                 
12 In 2015, in every state but Hawaii, for individuals in the highest tax bracket, the state ordinary income rate was 
the same as the state capital gains rate (source: The Tax Foundation, Center for State Tax Policy). Some states have 
provisions that exclude the capital gains on certain securities or a certain amount of capital gains from state income 
tax. 
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the post-War period, they also find little evidence that either the amount or form of managerial 
compensation responds to changes in tax rates. 
 Goolsbee (2000) examines the effect of an increase in the top federal income tax rate on 
the timing of option exercises in the period surrounding passage of the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1993.13 Goolsbee (2000) finds that the Act led managers to accelerate their 
option exercises. Hall and Liebman (2000) examine the effect of two pronounced decreases in 
the top federal income tax rate in the context of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (top 
federal rate reduced from 70% to 50%) and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (top federal rate 
reduced from 50% to 28%). In contrast to Goolsbee (2000), they find no evidence that large 
changes in income tax rates affected the timing of managers’ option exercises, and show that 
Goolsbee’s (2000) results are an artifact of failing to control for stock price appreciation.  
 Jin and Kothari (2008) find a negative relation between equity sales and the total tax 
liability that a manager would owe in connection with the sale of all of their vested equity 
holdings. Jin and Kothari (2008) calculate the total tax liability associated with the hypothetical 
sale of all of a manager’s vested equity holdings as the product of: (i) the respective tax rate, (ii) 
the appreciation in value (i.e., the difference between current stock price and cost basis), and (iii) 
the number of vested shares (or equivalents) in the manager’s portfolio. Importantly, since the 
total tax liability is a function of three variables––tax rate, price appreciation, and the number of 
vested shares––it is not clear whether the negative relation between managers’ tax liability and 
equity sales is evidence that (i) managers sell less when tax rates are high, (ii) managers sell less 
when prices are high, or (iii) managers sell less when they hold more equity.  
 While these studies focus on federal rather than state taxes, the consistent finding that 
relatively large changes in federal income taxes (e.g., from 50% to 28%) do not result in changes 
                                                 
13 The Act increased the top federal income tax rate from 31% to 39.6%. 
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in managers’ compensation and equity holdings suggests that it is unlikely that comparatively 
small changes in state income taxes would have a measurable effect on these outcomes.14 The 
results in prior literature, combined with explicit controls for managers’ pre-tax compensation 
and equity incentives in our tests, suggests that our findings are evidence of a “direct effect” of 
taxes.15  
3.3. Related literature on corporate taxes 
 Several recent studies explore the relation between corporate taxes and firm risk. For 
example, Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) and Ljungqvist et al. (2017) examine the relation 
between changes in state corporate tax rates and changes in firm leverage and earnings volatility, 
respectively. Both studies find evidence of a positive relation between state corporate taxes and 
risk-taking. Langenmayr and Lester (2017) examine the relation between a country’s statutory 
corporate tax rate and firms’ earnings volatility, and whether this relation varies with asymmetry 
in the corporate rate for gains and losses. Langenmayr and Lester (2017) show that when the 
corporate rate is symmetric (asymmetric), there is more (less) corporate risk-taking. Our study 
differs from these papers in that we examine managerial rather than corporate income taxes. We 
highlight three economic distinctions between these two types of taxes. 
(1) Managers v. Shareholders. The difference between who is taxed (shareholders or managers) 
manifests in the type of risk-taking that one might expect to observe. In particular, corporate 
                                                 
14 Supplemental analyses in the Internet Appendix extend these results to state taxes. Table IA.2 in the Internet 
Appendix reports no evidence of a relation between state income tax rates and either total cash pay or equity 
portfolio incentives in our sample. 
15 There is also a literature that examines labor migration in response to taxes. For example, Moretti and Wilson 
(2014, 2017) and Akcigit, Baslandze, and Stantcheva (2016) find that the geographic dispersion of scientists within 
a given corporation is affected by state tax changes. However, the existence of both intra-company geographic 
movement among a firm’s employees, i.e., employees relocating from offices in high tax jurisdictions to offices in 
low tax jurisdictions, and increased levels of corporate research are not necessarily inconsistent. There is also a 
potential difference between how scientists and managers are compensated. In particular, senior managers typically 
receive a fraction of the payoff from the project (which corresponds to δ in our framework), whereas many (but not 
all) researchers receive fixed compensation (i.e., δ = 0). If scientists do not receive a share of the project’s outcome, 
then higher income tax rates would not reduce the disutility associated with risky projects.  
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taxes fall on shareholders, and diversified shareholders are risk-averse with respect to systematic 
risk, but risk-neutral with respect to idiosyncratic risk.16 Consequently, corporate taxes should 
primarily affect the amount of systematic risk (i.e., risk that is non-diversifiable and is priced by 
shareholders). In contrast, managers are not diversified and are therefore averse to both 
systematic and idiosyncratic risk. Prior studies on corporate taxes and risk-taking generally do 
not make the distinction between managers or shareholders, or between idiosyncratic and 
systematic risk. 
 The incentives literature discusses how the difference between shareholders’ and 
managers’ aversion to idiosyncratic risk creates a risk-related agency problem whereby 
shareholders want managers to adopt all positive net present value (NPV) projects, regardless of 
their idiosyncratic risk, while managers prefer to reject some of those projects that entail “too 
much” idiosyncratic risk (e.g., Armstrong and Vashishtha, 2012; Armstrong, Core, and Guay, 
2016).  In our setting, taxes on managers (but not shareholders) encourage managers to take more 
risk in general. However, if managers were to take more systematic risk, shareholders would be 
directly affected and might seek to prevent this behavior (e.g., Acharya and Bisin, 2009; 
Armstrong and Vashishtha, 2012). In contrast, if managers were to take more idiosyncratic risk, 
then shareholders would be less likely to discourage this behavior––as idiosyncratic risk is 
diversifiable and shareholders want managers to adopt all NPV positive projects regardless of the 
level of idiosyncratic risk. Consequently, in equilibrium, we expect managerial taxes to primarily 
affect firms’ idiosyncratic rather than systematic risk. 
(2) Absence of Asymmetry. A manager’s marginal tax rate does not depend on corporate 
performance (i.e., corporate losses). In our sample, we find that 97% of CEOs are in the top tax 
                                                 
16 A fixed marginal tax rate will not alter well-diversified shareholders’ preferences toward idiosyncratic risk. If a 
project has a positive expected value, they will want to take it regardless of its idiosyncratic risk. 
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bracket based on their salaries alone. Moreover, we find no evidence that either poor accounting 
or stock performance alters their tax bracket.17 Regardless of whether the firm has a gain or loss, 
or increases or decreases R&D, we find that nearly all CEOs remain in the highest marginal tax 
bracket. Because a manager’s marginal tax rate does not depend on corporate performance, it 
does not have an asymmetric effect on risk-taking over gains and losses like capital gains taxes 
or corporate taxes (e.g., Auerbach, 1986). In our setting the marginal personal tax rate is fixed 
and results in increased risk-taking. Therefore, from a theoretical perspective, managerial and 
corporate taxes have potentially different effects on risk-taking.  
(3) Endogeneity and Measurement of Marginal Tax Rates. The marginal corporate tax rate and 
corporate investment decisions are endogenously determined. Recent literature uses plausibly 
exogenous variation in statutory corporate tax rates either across countries or across the state of 
firms’ headquarters to address this concern. However, statutory corporate tax rates are known to 
be a poor proxy for marginal corporate tax rates for at least two reasons (e.g., Shevlin, 1990; 
Graham, 1996; Blouin, Core, and Guay, 2010). First, the error with which statutory rates 
measure marginal rates is correlated with firm performance and risk (e.g., net operating losses).18 
In contrast, the sheer size of managers’ annual compensation implies that managers’ marginal 
income tax rates almost always coincide with the highest statutory tax rate, regardless of 
corporate performance or risk. Second, US corporations are subject to nexus rules that require 
them to pay taxes based on where their sales are made, their income is earned, and their assets 
and employees are located—not based on the state of the firm’s headquarters. Nexus issues are 
                                                 
17 We report and discuss this analysis in more detail in Table IA.1 of the Internet Appendix. 
18 Statutory tax rates measure marginal tax rates with error. Net operating losses increase the error with which 
statutory rates measure marginal rates. Firms that perform poorly and that take more risk are more likely to have net 
operating losses. Consequently, measurement error (i.e., the difference between the statutory tax rate and the true, 
but unobservable, marginal tax rate) is correlated with both firm performance and risk. 
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less of a concern in our setting since senior managers’ compensation is likely to be concentrated 
in—and therefore taxed by—the state of their firm’s headquarters.19 
 
4. Sample Construction and Variable Measurement 
4.1. Sample construction 
Our sample is constructed as the intersection of Compustat/CRSP, EDGAR, Execucomp, 
Thomson Institutional Ownership, and several government and non-profit datasets. Specifically, 
we require non-missing market value, total assets, total liabilities, cash holdings, plant, property, 
and equipment, sales, sales growth, and net income from Compustat; stock returns during the 
year from CRSP; historical location of the firm’s corporate headquarters from the firm’s 
EDGAR filings, and CEO cash compensation, equity ownership, age, and tenure from 
Execucomp. Additionally, we require data on political affiliation of state legislatures from the 
National Conference of State Legislatures; state economic activity from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis; corporate tax rates from the Federation of Tax Administrators; and federal and state 
personal income tax rates from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). We also 
collect data on state research and development tax credits and statutory carrybacks and 
carryforward periods from Wilson (2009), Ljungqvist et al. (2017), and state tax websites. Our 
sample is constructed as the intersection of these datasets, excluding financial service firms (SIC 
codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and consists of 16,490 firm-years (2,202 unique 
firms and 3,891 unique managers) from 1996 to 2012.  
We follow Jennings, Lee, and Matsumoto (2017) and determine the location of a firm’s 
corporate headquarters each year using the address the firm lists as its “principal executive 
offices” in its annual 10-K filing. Because firms update this address each time they file a 10-K, 
                                                 
19 Even if managers move their personal residence, their compensation is still taxed by the state in which it is earned. 
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this item reflects any changes in the state of a firm’s headquarters over time.20 Figure 3 presents 
the distribution of our sample according to the state of firms’ corporate headquarters. Figure 3 
shows that most of our sample firms are headquartered in California, Texas, Illinois, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, Massachusetts, and Connecticut. In our within-group 
analysis we use state- and firm- fixed effects to control for any systematic differences in 
corporate risk-taking between firms that are headquartered in these (and other) states.21 
4.2. Variable measurement 
4.2.1. Measurement of managerial taxes 
 We measures managerial taxes using cross-sectional and time-series variation in federal 
and state personal income tax rates. Our measure of managerial taxes, ManagerRate, is the 
combined marginal tax rate on personal income for individuals in the highest federal and state 
tax bracket. The rate is calculated assuming that managers pay income taxes in the state of the 
firm’s principal executive offices, are married filing jointly with $150,000 of itemized 
deductions (e.g., property taxes), and allowing for the reciprocal deductibility of federal and state 
income taxes where applicable (e.g., Feenberg and Coutts, 1993). Notably, every state taxes both 
residents and non-residents on income that was earned in the state. Thus, it seems reasonable to 
assume that managers are subject to income tax in the state of the firm’s principal executive 
offices. To the extent that managers do not pay income taxes in the state of their firm’s principal 
                                                 
20 Because this item is not available on Compustat, Jennings et al. (2017) use a Python script to “scrape” this 
information from 10-K filings on EDGAR. There are several alternative sources for identifying the state of a firm’s 
corporate headquarters, but these are known to have issues. For example, Compustat lists the state of a firm’s 
current corporate headquarters on the “Company” file, but does not provide the historical location of its 
headquarters. Alternatively, the SEC’s EDGAR system automatically appends a header to each corporate filing that 
includes the state of headquarters. However, Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) and Jennings et al. (2017) report that the 
header is updated with considerable delay and in an inconsistent manner. In untabulated analyses, we find that the 
positive relation between managerial taxes and corporate risk-taking continues to be significant at the 1% level when 
using either the state of headquarters listed on the SEC header data (available on Scott Dyreng’s website) or hand-
collected data provided by Alexander Ljungqvist. 
21 In untabulated analyses, we remove those states with fewer than 100 firm-year observations from our sample and 
continue to find that the positive relation between managerial taxes and corporate risk-taking is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. 
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executive offices, any resulting measurement error biases against finding a relation between 
managerial taxes and corporate risk-taking.22 
 We focus on a manager’s tax rate rather than a manager’s tax liability for two reasons. 
First, a manager’s tax liability reflects not only the tax rate, but also share price appreciation and 
the amount and form of the manager’s equity holdings (e.g., Jin and Kothari, 2008), both of 
which prior work suggests are endogenous with respect to corporate risk-taking (e.g., Coles et 
al., 2006; Hayes, Lemmon, and Qiu, 2012; Gormley et al., 2013). Second, apart from any 
concerns about endogeneity, the tax liability is the product of both managers’ equity holdings 
and the tax rate, and conflates two potential effects on risk-taking: the effect of holding more 
equity and the effect of a higher tax rate. Given our prediction that higher tax rates lead to 
increased risk-taking, whereas greater equity holdings can lead to decreased risk-taking (e.g., 
Lambert et al., 1991; Ross, 2004; Armstrong and Vashishtha, 2012), these effects could work in 
opposite directions. The opposing nature of these effects makes it difficult to use managers’ tax 
liability to draw meaningful inferences about the effect of taxes on corporate risk-taking. Instead, 
we follow prior work in the tax responsiveness literature in economics (see Saez, Slemrod, and 
Giertz, 2012 for a review) and measure the tax rate on senior managers directly.  
4.2.2. Measurement of corporate risk-taking 
 Following prior work in the incentive-compensation literature, our primary measure of 
corporate risk-taking, RiskyInvest, is annual research and development expense scaled by ending 
total assets (e.g., Coles et al. 2006; Gormley et al., 2013).23 In the context of our research 
                                                 
22 Data are from NBER TAXSIM and are available at: http://users.nber.org/~taxsim/state-rates/. Table IA.3 of the 
Internet Appendix repeats our primary tests using the marginal tax rate calculated without assuming any itemized 
deductions. This alternative rate is 0.99 correlated with that used in our analysis. Inferences are unaffected. All 
measures of managerial taxes used in our analysis are available at (BLIND WEBSITE). 
23 Following these studies, we replace missing values of research and development with zero. In untabulated 
analyses, we find that the positive relation between managerial taxes and corporate risk-taking continues to be 
statistically significant at the 1% level if we exclude such observations. 
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question, research and development has several desirable properties as a measure of risky 
investment. First, it is directly controllable by senior managers and is commonly viewed as being 
more risky than alternative uses of funds (e.g., Bhagat and Welch, 1995; Kothari, Laguerre, and 
Leone, 2002). Second, unlike earnings-based measures of risk (e.g., earnings volatility), research 
and development is not mechanically affected by managers’ accrual choices (e.g., depreciation, 
bad debt expense, etc.), and unlike market-based measures of risk (e.g., return volatility), 
research and development is not mechanically affected by the disclosure of public information, 
trading activity in the capital market, or taxes on shareholders (e.g., capital gains taxes). 
Nevertheless, to ensure that our inferences are not unique to this specific measurement choice, in 
subsequent analyses we confirm that our results are robust to using three alternative measures of 
risk-taking: earnings volatility, idiosyncratic return volatility, and systematic return volatility.  
4.3. Descriptive statistics 
 Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for our sample at the firm-, manager-, and state-
levels in Panels A, B, and C, respectively. All variables are as defined in Appendix B and are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.24 Panel A shows that the average (median) firm in our 
sample has just over $6.3 ($1.1) billion in total assets (mean Assets = $6,397, median Assets = 
$1,156). Panel B shows that average ManagerRate is 41% with a standard deviation of 3%. The 
minimum ManagerRate is 35%, which is the tax rate on individuals working in states without a 
personal income tax in the years after the “Bush tax cuts” (beginning 2003), and the maximum 
ManagerRate is 46.7%, which is the rate for individuals working in California prior to the Bush 
tax cuts. Panel C shows that the average firm has a combined federal and state statutory tax rate 
of 40% (mean CorporateRate = 0.40), the statutory rate at which the firms may claim a R&D tax 
                                                 
24 In untabulated analyses, we find that the positive relation between managerial taxes and corporate risk-taking 
continues to be statistically significant at the 1% level if we do not winsorize variables. 
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credit is 6% (mean R&DCredit = 0.06), and can carry net operating losses back (forward) 0.69 
(13.61) years (mean CorpCarryBack = 0.69, mean CorpCarryForward = 13.61).25 
Table 2 presents average values of ManagerRate by year, as well as the top federal rate 
for the year. Prior to 2003, the average ManagerRate varies between 43% and 44%. Beginning in 
2003 (i.e., after the Bush tax cuts), the average ManagerRate varies between 39% and 40%. In 
all years, the interquartile range (i.e., the difference between the 25th and 75th percentiles) is 
between 2% and 4%. This suggests that the amount of variation in taxes over time is similar to 
the amount of variation in taxes across states. Indeed, we find that time-series variation accounts 
for 55% of the total variation in ManagerRate (cross-sectional variation accounts for the 
remainder).26 Notably, during our sample period, the total variation in the top federal rate (std. 
dev. of 0.02) is equal to the within-year variation in the top state rate (std. dev. of 0.02). This 
suggests that there are similar amounts of variation in both rates during our sample period. 
Figure 4 presents average values of ManagerRate by state. When ranked according to average 
ManagerRate, the top five states are Vermont, Rhode Island, New Mexico, North Dakota, and 
California, and the bottom five states are Wyoming, Texas, Nevada, Florida, South Dakota, and 
Washington (tied).  
 
5. Empirical Tests and Results 
5.1. Between-group analysis 
 In our first set of tests, we conduct a between-group analysis that relies on comparisons 
between time periods, states, and firms. These tests estimate the relation between managerial 
                                                 
25 Data on R&DCredit through 2006 were provided by Wilson (2009), and data on CorpCarryBack and 
CorpCarryForward were provided by Ljungqvist et al. (2016), ignoring nexus issues. Data on these variables in 
subsequent years comes from tax forms available on state Department of Revenue websites. 
26 55% is calculated as the adjusted-R2 from a regression of ManagerRate on year fixed effects. 
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taxes and corporate risk-taking using all of the variation in managerial taxes, regardless of its 
source (i.e., federal or state, cross-sectional or time-series). In our first set of tests, we estimate 
the following pooled regression: 
 RiskyInvestt+1 = γ0 + γ1ManagerRatet + ω FirmControlst  
  + π ManagerControlst + ψ StateControlst + εt (8) 
where RiskyInvest and ManagerRate are as previously defined, FirmControls is a vector of time-
varying firm-level controls, ManagerControls is a vector of time-varying manager-level controls, 
and StateControls is a vector of time-varying state-level controls. Throughout all of our analyses, 
we base our inferences on standard errors that are two-way clustered by state and year.27 
 Similar to prior research (e.g., Coles et al., 2006; Ljungqvist et al., 2017), we control for 
the following firm-level variables: firm size (Log(Assets)), firm leverage (Leverage), market-to-
book ratio (MB), sales growth (SalesGrowth), capital intensity (CapIntensity), cash holdings 
(Cash), accounting performance (ROA and Loss), whether the firm has a tax loss carryforward 
(TaxLoss), stock returns (Returns), and ownership by retail investors (RetailOwn).28 The 
inclusion of retail ownership helps control for the possibility that variation in risk-taking is 
driven by the composition of the investor base. Since retail investors are more prone to home 
bias, controlling for the size of the retail investor base (i.e., holding the composition of the 
investor base fixed) controls for any potential home bias. 
 Following Armstrong et al. (2013), we also control for the following manager-level 
variables: CEO age (Log(Age)), tenure (Log(Tenure)), pre-tax cash compensation 
                                                 
27 In untabulated analyses we find that the positive relation between managerial taxes and corporate risk-taking is 
statistically significant at the 1% level if we either (i) cluster by state only, (ii) cluster by firm only, or (iii) two-way 
cluster by firm and year. 
28 Our set of firm-level controls generally subsumes those used in prior research on the determinants of 
“discretionary” research and development expense (e.g., Roychowdhury, 2006). See Becker (2013) for a list of 
controls used in prior research that models research and development expense. 
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(Log(CashPay)), and pre-tax equity incentives (Log(Delta)) and Log(Vega)). The inclusion of 
these variables controls for risk-taking incentives provided by CEOs’ pre-tax compensation and 
pre-tax equity incentives. We control for the level and structure of compensation in order to 
isolate the “direct effect” of managers’ tax rates on risk-taking (i.e., the top arrow in Figure 3).  
 Following Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) and Ljungqvist et al. (2017), we control for the 
growth in gross state product (StateEconGrowth) and, notwithstanding the aforementioned nexus 
issues, the highest combined federal and state statutory corporate tax rate, (CorporateTax), the 
statutory rate at which firms may claim a state R&D tax credit (R&DCredit), and the number of 
years which a firm can carry back (forward) a net operating loss in the state (CorpCarryBack and 
CorpCarryForward). Following Gilligan and Matsusaka (2001) and Omer and Shelley (2004), 
we also control for the political affiliation of the governor (RepubGovernor) and the political 
affiliation of the legislature (RepubLegislature).  
Table 4 presents results from estimating Eq. (8). Column (1) reports a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient on ManagerRate in the absence of any controls (t-stat 2.51). 
Columns (2) through (4) progressively add time-varying firm-, manager-, and state-level 
controls. When firm-level controls are included, column (2) shows that although the coefficient 
on ManagerRate is smaller in magnitude (i.e., 0.246), the precision of the estimate increases (t-
stat 5.34). Columns (3) and (4) report similar results after the inclusion of manager and state 
characteristics.  
The estimate of the effect of taxes without controls for managers’ compensation and 
equity incentives is 0.246, whereas the estimate of the effect of taxes with these controls is 0.237. 
The former specification conflates both the indirect and direct effects in Figure 3, whereas the 
latter specification measures only the direct effect since it controls for the amount and structure 
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of managers’ incentive-compensation. In other words, because we hold compensation and equity 
incentives fixed, the coefficient on ManagerRate in the latter specification measures the effect of 
taxes on risk-taking for a fixed incentive-compensation package. The small difference between 
the two estimates suggests that the indirect effect of taxes on risk-taking––operating through the 
incentive-compensation channel––is modest. This finding is consistent with inferences from 
prior research that suggest that boards do not alter managers’ compensation or equity incentives 
in response to changes in personal income tax rates (e.g., Goolsbee, 2000; Hall and Liebman, 
2000; Frydman and Molloy, 2011). 
Column (5) reports results after decomposing ManagerRate into the federal tax 
component, ManagerRate_Fed, and the state tax component, ManagerRate_State.29 The key 
difference between these rates is that the federal rate varies over time, but not across firms, while 
the state rate varies both over time and across firms. We find a positive relation between both 
federal and state taxes and corporate risk-taking (t-stats 1.94 and 2.65, respectively).30 Because 
there is no cross-sectional variation in the federal rate, we caution that this test cannot distinguish 
between the effect of the federal rate and the effect of any confounding macroeconomic events or 
time trends. To overcome these issues, our subsequent analyses exploit variation in tax rates 
across states and within states.    
5.2. Within-group analysis 
                                                 
29 ManagerRate_Fed is the rate on the top federal income tax bracket, and ManagerRate_State is the difference 
between ManagerRate and ManagerRate_Fed. While federal and state taxes are not strictly additive, calculating 
ManagerRate_State in this manner ensures that the effects of cross-deductibility and compounding appear in state 
taxes (so that all individuals have the same federal rate). 
30 Similar to Ljungqvist et al. (2016, Table 7, Panel B), we find no evidence of a relation between the corporate tax 
rate and research and development expense.  
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 In our second set of tests, we conduct a within-group analysis that relies on comparisons 
within a given time period, state, firm, or manager. Specifically, we modify Eq. (8) to include 
year, state, firm, and manager fixed effects: 
 RiskyInvestt+1 = γ0 + γ1ManagerRatet  
 + ω FirmControlst + π ManagerControlst + ψ StateControlst  
  + χ Yeart + Ψ State + Ω Firm + Γ Manager + εt  (9) 
We estimate four versions of Eq. (9) that progressively add each of the four levels of fixed 
effects, beginning with year fixed effects. In each specification, we require at least two 
observations at the level of each fixed-effect (e.g., at least two observations per firm in 
specifications that include firm fixed effects). This requirement results in slightly different 
sample sizes across the four specifications.31 
 There are two noteworthy features of this research design. First, in the presence of year 
fixed effects, the only remaining variation in ManagerRate is at the state-level. Thus, our second 
set of tests estimate the relation between managerial taxes and corporate risk-taking using 
exclusively state-level variation in managerial taxes, which consists of both variation in 
managerial taxes across states and time-series variation in managerial taxes within a given state. 
Accordingly, this set of tests effectively controls for any and all variation in federal tax rates. 
Second, the inclusion of state, firm, and manager fixed effects controls for any cross-sectional 
differences between states, firms (and industries), or managers that might otherwise confound 
our results. For example, California generally has the highest top personal income tax rate and 
firms in California are predominantly technology firms that are known to take substantial risk. 
By including state, firm, and manager effects, these tests estimate the relation between 
managerial taxes and corporate risk-taking using only variation in managerial taxes within a 
                                                 
31 Note that manager fixed-effects can be estimated in the presence of firm fixed-effects because of variation in the 
CEO-firm pairing during our sample period. For those CEOs and firms that are always paired together, we exclude 
the respective CEO effect. 
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given state, firm, or manager. Thus, these tests remove any time-invariant cross-sectional effects 
that might otherwise explain our results.32  
  Table 5 presents results from estimating Eq. (9). In every specification, we find robust 
evidence of a positive relation between managerial taxes and corporate risk-taking. The 
coefficient on ManagerRate ranges from 0.203 to 0.347, with the associated t-statistics ranging 
from 2.74 to 6.51. As a robustness check, column (5) presents results from replacing year fixed 
effects with industry-year fixed effects, which are constructed as a unique vector of year fixed 
effects for each two-digit SIC code. This specification controls for any time-varying industry 
shocks that might arise as a result of technological changes within an industry or secular industry 
trends. We continue to find a positive relation between managerial taxes and corporate risk-
taking (t-stat 3.82).  
 Having shown a statistically significant positive relation between managers’ personal tax 
rates and corporate risk-taking, we next assess the economic magnitude of this relation. To 
calculate the economic magnitudes, we estimate the change in research and development 
expenditure for a 100 basis point increase in the tax rate (e.g., from 39% to 40%). The coefficient 
from column (4) in Table 3 is 0.135. This implies that a 100 basis point increase in the tax rate is 
associated with a 13.5 basis point increase in the ratio of R&D to assets (e.g., from 4% of assets 
for the average firm to 4.135% of assets).  
 This estimate comes with four caveats. (1) Theory does not provide predictions about the 
magnitude of the effect, so we have no basis for gauging whether an effect is “too large” or “too 
small” to be plausible. (2) Point estimates often vary substantially depending on the particular 
                                                 
32 For example, the inclusion of firm fixed effects controls for those firms that never invest in research and 
development during our sample period. In untabulated analyses, we find that the positive relation between 
managerial taxes and corporate risk-taking remains statistically significant at the 1% level if we exclude these firms 
from the sample. We choose to retain these firms because our alternative measures of risk-taking are not based on 
research and development, and because eliminating these firms introduces the potential for look-ahead bias. 
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specification. For example, the point estimate of the effect size in the absence of controls is 43.9 
basis points (column (1) of Table 3), compared to 13.5 basis points with controls (column (4) of 
Table 3), and 23.7 basis points with controls and fixed effects (column (4) of Table 4).33 (3) Our 
point estimates have large confidence intervals. For example, the 95% confidence interval for 
our point estimate of 0.135 is 0.046-0.223. Thus, a 100 basis point increase in the tax rate is 
associated with anywhere between a 4.6 and 22.3 basis point increase in the ratio of R&D to 
assets and we can not distinguish between effect sizes in this interval. (4) We caution against 
linearly extrapolating these estimates to larger (e.g., 500 or 1000 basis point) changes in tax 
rates. In the presence of a concave efficient frontier (as in Section 2, see e.g., Figures 1 and 2), 
the effect of a 1000 basis point change will not be ten times that of a 100 basis point change. The 
effects we document are locally linear, but not globally linear. 
5.3. Cross-sectional predictions 
 In our next set of tests, we examine settings where theory predicts that the relation 
between managerial taxes and corporate risk-taking will be particularly strong. If our theoretical 
predictions are empirically descriptive, then these settings should provide more powerful tests of 
our predictions. In particular, theory suggests the positive relation between managers’ personal 
tax rate and corporate risk-taking will be stronger at firms with investment opportunities that 
have a higher rate of return per unit of risk, and for CEOs who have a lower marginal disutility 
of risk (see, for example Eq. (5)).  
 Our tests proceed as follows. First, we develop proxies for each of these firm- and 
manager- specific characteristics and partition our sample into observations with relatively high 
                                                 
33 We focus on effect size from the between-group analysis without fixed effects because in the presence of fixed 
effects, the estimated effect size is not representative. For example, in the presence of year, state, firm, and manager 
fixed effects, the coefficient is empirically identified using only a small portion of the variation in tax rates and 
represents a “within” effect.  
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and low values of each proxy. Second, we estimate Eq. (9) separately for each subsample and 
test for a difference in the coefficient on ManagerRate between the two subsamples. For 
example, we develop an empirical proxy for θ, the slope of the investment opportunity set 
featured in Eq. (5), and then test whether the positive relation between taxes and risk-taking is 
more pronounced in settings where θ is high. Viewing ManagerRate as the exogenous 
“treatment,” these tests examine whether there is evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects 
(i.e., whether the treatment effect varies with θ). The advantage of this research design (i.e., 
estimating separate treatment effects for each setting) is that it does not constrain the coefficients 
on our control variables or fixed effects to be the same across the various settings.34  
5.3.1. Investment opportunity set 
 Table 5 presents results from examining whether the relation between managerial taxes 
and corporate risk-taking is stronger in firms that have an investment opportunity set that yields a 
higher rate of return per unit of risk. We measure the rate of return using two measures of the 
slope of the investment opportunity set, Industry Q and Industry θ, with larger values of each 
measure corresponding to greater returns for each additional unit of risk.35 Industry Q is the 
aggregate Tobin’s Q of the respective industry-year. Industry Q is calculated as the market value 
of equity plus book value of debt for all firms in the industry-year, scaled by book value of assets 
for all firms in the industry-year.36 Industry θ is a structural estimate of the slope coefficient in 
                                                 
34 We use the median to partition the sample to ensure that the two resulting sub-samples are of similar size and, in 
turn, that our tests have similar power. Note that this design is equivalent to fully interacting an indicator for whether 
the observation is above or below the median with all of the control variables and fixed effects, and testing whether 
the interaction with ManagerRate is different from zero. 
35 We use the relation between risk and return at the industry-level to proxy for the relation between risk and return 
at the project level. Although our theoretical discussion in Section 2 is framed in terms of a manager of a firm 
choosing among risky projects, an alternative interpretation is to assume that the manager instead directly selects the 
risk of the firm as a whole. In this regard, Eq. (3) can be thought of as describing a firm’s efficient frontier, and the 
manager simply chooses where on the frontier his firm will be located.  
36 In untabulated analyses, we find that our inferences are robust to using the average Tobin’s Q for all firms in the 
respective industry-year. 
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Eq. (3) estimated at the industry-year level. In particular, for all firm-years within a given 
industry-year, we estimate a regression of buy-and-hold returns during the year on the natural 
logarithm of one plus the variance of monthly stock returns during the year. The slope coefficient 
from this regression corresponds to θ in Eq. (3). Larger values of Q and θ correspond to a greater 
marginal benefit for each additional unit of risk.  
 Panel A presents results from estimating the relation between managerial taxes and 
corporate risk-taking after partitioning on Industry Q. First, consistent with our theoretical 
predictions, we find higher levels of risky investment in settings where Industry Q is high 
(difference in mean RiskyInvest of 0.031, p-value < 0.01). The notion that managers take more 
risk in industries with high Q validates that Industry Q measures the returns to risk-taking.  
Second, consistent with our predictions, we find that the effect of managerial taxes on risk-taking 
is stronger in industries with high Q. For firms in high Q industries (Industry Q > 1.49), the 
coefficient on ManagerRate is 0.464 (t-stat 3.15) and for firms in low Q industries (Industry Q ≤ 
1.49) the coefficient on ManagerRate is –0.056 (t-stat –1.02). The difference between these two 
coefficients is statistically significant at the 1% level (two-tailed p-value < 0.01).  
 Panel B presents similar results, but with somewhat lower levels of statistical 
significance, when using Industry θ to measure the rate of return on the investment opportunity 
set. Collectively, the results in Table 5 suggest that the effect of managerial taxes on corporate 
risk-taking is stronger in firms that have an investment opportunity set that yields a higher rate of 
return per unit of risk. Indeed, for some industries—namely those with relatively low Q—we 
find that the rewards to risk-taking are sufficiently small that managerial taxes do not incentivize 
risk-taking. 
5.3.2. Managers’ marginal disutility to risk 
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 Table 6 presents results from examining whether the relation between managerial taxes 
and corporate risk-taking is stronger for CEOs who have a relatively low marginal disutility of 
risk. We measure the marginal disutility of risk using two CEO-specific characteristics, Delta 
and Age, where Delta is the sensitivity of the CEO’s equity portfolio to a 1% change in stock 
price (in millions) and Age is the CEO’s age in years. Larger values of both measures correspond 
to a greater marginal disutility of risk. In particular, older CEOs are commonly thought to be 
more risk averse, where greater levels of risk aversion correspond to a greater disutility to risk-
taking (e.g., Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Malmendier, Tate, and Yan, 2011; Malmendier and 
Nagel, 2011). In addition, although Delta technically increases both the marginal benefit and the 
marginal disutility to risk (see Armstrong et al., 2013 for a discussion), we find that the latter 
effect dominates theoretically and empirically.37 As a consequence, in our setting, Delta should 
primarily capture the marginal disutility to risk-taking.  
 Panel A presents results from estimating the relation between managerial taxes and 
corporate risk-taking after partitioning on Delta. First, consistent with our theoretical framework, 
we find higher levels of risky investment in settings where Delta is relatively low (difference in 
mean RiskyInvest of 0.009, p-value < 0.01). The notion that CEOs with less Delta take more risk 
corroborates the validity of Delta as a measure of the disutility to risk-taking. Second, consistent 
with our predictions, we find that the effect of managerial taxes on risk-taking is stronger for 
CEOs whose portfolios are relatively less sensitive to changes in stock price. For CEOs with a 
relatively low sensitivity (Delta ≤ 0.22), the coefficient on ManagerRate is 0.701 (t-stat 4.54), 
whereas for CEOs with a relatively high sensitivity (Delta > 0.22), the coefficient on 
                                                 
37 Theoretically, Eq. (7) shows that the manager’s risk aversion (β) and pay-for-performance sensitivity (δ) affect the 
choice of risky project in exactly the same manner; and empirically, Delta is known to be negatively related to risk-
taking (see Table 3 and Coles et al., 2006). 
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ManagerRate is –0.091 (t-stat –1.32). The difference between these two coefficients is 
statistically significant at the 1% level (two-tailed p-value < 0.01).  
 Panel B presents similar results, but with somewhat lower of statistical significance, 
when using Age to measure the marginal disutility to risk-taking. Collectively, the results in 
Table 6 suggest that the effect of managerial taxes on corporate risk-taking is stronger for CEOs 
who have a relatively low marginal disutility to risk-taking. Indeed, for some CEOs—namely 
those whose portfolios are more sensitive to price changes—we find that the disutility associated 
with risk-taking is sufficiently high that managerial taxes do not incentivize risk-taking. 
 
6. Sensitivity Analyses 
6.1. Whose taxes? 
 Table 7 presents results from estimating Eq. (9) after including the tax rate on middle-
income earners (NonManagerRate) as an additional control. This analysis provides an important 
sensitivity test that helps to rule out other potential alternative explanations for our main results. 
For example, it is conceivable that the tax rate on senior managers is correlated with the tax rate 
on lower-level employees or retail investors and that it is these individuals—rather than senior 
managers—who are responsible for the tax-induced risk-taking. By including NonManagerRate 
as an additional control, the coefficient on ManagerRate measures the relation between corporate 
risk-taking and the difference, or “wedge,” between the tax rates on high- and middle-income 
earners. Accordingly, this specification controls for any omitted variables that have a similar 
correlation with these two rates. If an omitted variable is correlated with both the tax rates in the 
same way, then controlling for the latter effectively controls for the omitted variable. 
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 We use two measure of NonManagerRate: (i) the average tax rate paid by residents of the 
firm’s state of headquarters, AverageResidentRate, and (ii) the combined federal and state 
marginal tax rate on $100,000 of wage income (married filing jointly), MargRate100K.38 Panel 
A reports descriptive statistics for these variables. Note that the standard deviations of these 
alternative tax rates are 0.02 and 0.04, compared to 0.03 for ManagerRate. This suggests that 
there are similar amounts of variation in all three rates. Not surprisingly, Panel B indicates that 
our measures of NonManagerRate are highly correlated with ManagerRate (correlations range 
from 0.76 to 0.82).  
 Panel C presents regression results. Columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) present results when 
including NonManagerRate, but excluding ManagerRate. We find a positive relation between 
NonManagerRate and corporate risk-taking that is marginally significant in one specification, in 
the absence of fixed effects (column (1) t-stat of 1.74), but that it is not significant in the other 
three columns. Columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) present results from including NonManagerRate 
simultaneously with ManagerRate. When the two variables are included simultaneously, we find 
no evidence of a relation between NonManagerRate and corporate risk-taking, but continue to 
find strong evidence of a relation between ManagerRate and corporate risk-taking. Collectively, 
these results suggest that the relation between managerial taxes and corporate risk-taking is not 
an artifact of taxes on middle-income employees or retail investors. 
6.2. Alternative measures of risk-taking 
                                                 
38 AverageResidentRate is calculated as federal and state income taxes paid by residents of the firm’s state of 
headquarters scaled by adjusted gross income of state residents. Data on AverageResidentRate ends in 2011 and is 
available at http://users.nber.org/~taxsim/allyup/. 
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 Table 8 presents results from estimating Eq. (9) using three alternative measures of risk-
taking: earnings volatility (EarnVol), idiosyncratic risk (IdVol), and systematic risk (SysVol).39 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics for each of the three alternative measures, and Panel B 
presents regression results. Consistent with the additional risk-taking manifesting in more 
volatile earnings, column (1) reports a positive relation between managerial taxes and earnings 
volatility (ManagerRate t-stat 2.26). Columns (2) and (3) present results for idiosyncratic and 
systematic risk. Consistent with the additional risk-taking primarily being idiosyncratic in nature, 
we find a strong positive relation between managerial taxes and idiosyncratic risk and no relation 
between managerial taxes and systematic risk (ManagerRate t-stats 3.28 and 0.62, respectively).  
6.3 Alternative specifications 
 To further assess the robustness of our findings, we conduct four additional analyses 
described briefly below, and in greater detail in the Internet Appendix.  
1. We estimate Eq. (9) after including additional time-varying state-level controls for: (i) state 
real estate prices, (ii) state tax credits for capital expenditures, (iii) state tax credits for job 
creation, (iv) state unemployment rates, (v) the fraction of the state’s population with a 
bachelor’s degree, and (vi) the fraction of the state’s population that are high-income earners. 
Table IA.4 shows that the inclusion of these additional controls does not affect our 
inferences.  
2. We estimate Eq. (9) after including an indicator for whether the state tax rate applied 
retroactively, and the interaction between this indicator and ManagerRate. Table IA.5 shows 
                                                 
39 Following Ljungqvist et al. (2017), EarnVol is the variance of seasonally-adjusted quarterly pre-tax earnings over 
the subsequent eight quarters multiplied by 100, where quarterly pre-tax earnings is calculated as operating income 
after depreciation scaled by total assets, and seasonally adjusted by subtracting the value in the same quarter of the 
prior year. IdVol (SysVol) is calculated as the variance of residuals (predicted values) from a Fama-French four 
factor model estimated for each firm-year using monthly returns over the subsequent year and multiplied by 100 for 
ease of interpretation. 
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that: (i) retroactive tax rate changes are rare (N = 393 firm-year observations), and (ii) the 
interaction term is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that retroactive tax rates 
have less of an effect on corporate risk-taking.  
3. We estimate Eq. (9) distinguishing between tax rate increases and decreases, and 
distinguishing between large and small changes (2 x 2). Table IA.6 reports that the 
coefficients on small increases and small decreases are statistically insignificant, consistent 
with managers not responding to small rate changes. Table IA.6 also reports that the 
coefficient on large increases is statistically significant in all specifications, while the 
coefficient on large decreases is of similar magnitude but is not statistically distinguishable 
from zero. F-tests fail to reject a difference between the magnitudes of the coefficients on 
large increases and large decreases (p-value 0.74).  
4. We estimate Eq. (9) including three leads and three lags of ManagerRatet. This lead-lag 
specification is commonly used in prior work as a way to assess the validity of assumptions 
related to timing and parallel trends. Table IA.7 reports that the coefficient on ManagerRatet 
remains statistically significant, and that the coefficients on all lead and lags are not 
significantly different from zero, which is consistent with parallel trends.40 
 
7. Conclusion 
                                                 
40 We provide two caveats. First, while the inclusion of multiple leads and lags of the independent variable of 
interest is a common specification used to assess the validity of the parallel trends assumption (e.g., Atansov and 
Black, 2016; Ljungqvist et al., 2017), this assumption is inherently untestable––in the same way that the correlated 
omitted variable assumption is also untestable (e.g., Roberts and Whited, 2013; Bertomeu, Beyer, and Taylor, 2016). 
Thus, even if the leads and lags are not statistically significant, this test can not validate the parallel trends 
assumption (it can only invalidate it). Second, we caution that the inclusion of multiple leads and lags (in addition to 
control variables and the firm-, state-, and year fixed effects) produces a highly multicolinear specification. For 
example, the correlation between ManagerRatet and ManagerRatet-1 is 0.96. Consequently, empirical identification 
comes from a relatively small amount of variation and these results should be interpreted with caution. This 
limitation is not unique to our setting and potentially applies to any specification that includes multiple leads and 
lags of the variable of interest. 
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 We examine the relation between managers’ personal tax rates and their corporate 
investment decisions. We use a simple theoretical framework to illustrate how taxes reduce the 
disutility a risk-averse manager associates with risky investment and increase the incentive (or, 
equivalently, reduce the disincentive) to take risk; and to illustrate how the effect varies with 
firm and manager characteristics. Consistent with our theoretical predictions, we find evidence of 
a strong positive relation between managerial tax rates and corporate risk-taking, and that this 
relation is stronger in firms where the investment opportunity set provides a relatively high rate 
of return per unit of risk, and for senior managers who have a relatively low marginal disutility 
of risk. By linking the relation between managers’ personal tax rates and corporate risk-taking to 
characteristics of the firm and CEO, these findings strengthen our inference that the relation is 
attributable to a reduction in the disutility that risk-averse managers associate with risky projects. 
 In additional analyses, we find that our results are unique to senior managers’ tax rates––
we do not find similar relations for middle-income tax rates––and we find that the tax-induced 
risk-taking relates to idiosyncratic rather than systematic risk. These findings suggest that the 
tax-induced risk-taking that we document is not attributable to taxes on either lower-level 
employees or retail investors, and that it is diversifiable. Collectively, we are among the first to 
suggest that managers’ personal tax rates affect their corporate investment and risk-taking 
decisions, and our findings suggest that this is a promising area for future research. 
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Appendix A. Personal Income Taxes on Managerial Compensation 
 
In this Appendix we review the personal income tax treatment of the most common forms of 
managerial compensation (see Hall and Liebman, 2000 for a review of the parallel corporate tax 
treatment). 
 
Employee stock options. Most employee stock options are treated as non-qualified stock options 
(NQSOs) for income tax purposes. NQSOs have no tax implications when they are granted 
However, at the time of exercise, the difference between the stock price and the exercise price is 
taxed at the ordinary income tax rate.41 
 
Stock appreciation rights. Stock appreciation rights (SARs) are instruments that replicate the 
payoff of a stock option, and pay the employee the difference between the stock price and the 
exercise price when exercised. The primary difference is that, unlike stock options, SARs do not 
require the employee to pay the exercise price to the corporation and the employee does not 
receive shares of stock upon exercise. Although less common than stock options, SARS are 
generally taxed the same as NQSOs. 
 
Restricted stock. Restricted stock grants are taxed at the ordinary income tax rate when the shares 
vest, at which point they become unrestricted stock. In the event of immediate vesting, they are 
taxed in the year of the grant as ordinary income.42  
 
Unrestricted stock. Unrestricted stock refers to stock that was obtained through option exercises, 
restricted stock that has vested, or stock that the employee purchased on the open market. Gains 
on unrestricted stock are subject to capital gains tax when realized at the time of the sale. Any 
realized short-term capital gains (from holding shares less than a year) are taxed at the ordinary 
income rate, while any long-term capital gains (from holding shares more than a year) are taxed 
at the long-term capital gains rate. 
 
Pension and Deferred Compensation. The tax treatment of pensions and deferred compensation 
can be quite complicated, but in general, these forms of compensation are taxable to the 
employee after the employee retires and therefore have no current tax consequences. 
 
Salary, Bonus, Perquisites, and Long-term Incentive Plans. In addition to equity grants, most 
senior managers receive an annual salary, bonus, and various perquisites such as the use of a 
corporate jet or car. These are all generally taxed as ordinary income in the year received. Many 
executives also receive long-term incentive plan payouts, which are typically in the form of cash. 
These payments are also taxed as ordinary income in the year received.  
                                                 
41 The second type of employee stock options is known as incentive stock options (ISOs), which are far less 
common than NQSOs. ISOs are limited to $100,000 that can vest for a manager per year, and their appreciation is 
not tax-deductible for the company. However, there is a tax advantage for the manager because the profits from 
exercising ISOs are not taxed as ordinary income. Instead, the executive is only liable for capital gains tax on any 
appreciation of the shares acquired from exercising the options. Hall and Liebman (2000) find that ISOs account for 
less than five percent of total option awards. 
42 Executives also have the option to make a Section 83(b) election for restricted stock grants. This election results 
in the restricted stock being taxed immediately (i.e., at the time of the grant) as ordinary income and any subsequent 
gains and losses being taxed at the capital gains rate. However, managers rarely make the Section 83(b) election in 
practice (e.g., Jin and Kothari, 2008). 
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Appendix B. Variable Definitions 
 
This Appendix defines the variables used in our primary analyses. 
 
Firm Characteristics 
Assets Book value of total assets. 
  
Leverage Book value of total debt to the book value of total assets. 
  
MB Market value of assets to book value of assets. 
  
SalesGrowth Change in sales scaled by lag sales. 
  
CapIntensity Net plant, property, and equipment scaled by total assets. 
  
Cash Cash holdings scaled by total assets. 
  
ROA Income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets. 
  
Loss An indicator variable equal to one if income before extraordinary items is negative and 
zero otherwise. 
  
LossCarry An indicator variable equal to one if the firm has a tax loss carryover and zero otherwise. 
  
Return Buy and hold return over the year. 
  
RetailOwn One minus the fraction of institutional ownership. 
  
RiskyInvest Research and development expense scaled by total assets. 
  
Industry Q Market value of equity plus book value of debt of all firms in the industry-year scaled by 
book value of assets of all firms in the industry-year. 
  
Industry θ Slope coefficient from a regression of buy-and-hold return over the year on the natural log 
of one plus the variance of monthly returns over the year. Regressions are estimated 
separately for each industry-year. 
  
EarnVol Variance of seasonally-adjusted quarterly pre-tax earnings over the subsequent eight 
quarters, where quarterly pre-tax earnings (Earni,t,q) is calculated as operating income after 
depreciation scaled by total assets, and we seasonally adjust by subtracting the value in the 
same quarter of the prior year (Earni,t,q – Earni,t-1,q) and multiplied by 100. 
  
IdVol Variance of residuals from a Fama French four factor model estimated annually for each 
firm over the subsequent year and multiplied by 100. 
  
SysVol Variance of predicted values from a Fama French four factor model estimated annually for 
each firm over the subsequent year and multiplied by 100. 
 
CEO Characteristics 
ManagerRate Highest combined federal and state income tax rate, assuming the individual is in top 
brackets at both the federal and state levels, married filing jointly with $150,000 in 
deductible property taxes, and allowing for deductibility of state income taxes in states 
where applicable.  
  
Age Age of the manager (in years). 
  
Tenure Tenure of the manager (in years). 
  
CashPay Total cash compensation (in millions). 
  
TotalPay Total compensation (in millions). 
  
Delta Dollar change of the CEO's portfolio value for a 1% change in firm stock price (in 
millions). 
  
Vega Dollar change of the CEO's portfolio value for a 0.01 change in return volatility (in 
millions). 
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State Characteristics 
StateEconGrowth The change in gross state product, scaled by the beginning gross state product. 
  
RepubGovernor Indicator variable equal to one if the state's governor identifies as a Republican and zero 
otherwise.  
  
RepubLegislature Indicator variable equal to one if all houses of the state's legislature have a majority of 
members who identify as Republican and zero otherwise.  
  
CorporateRate Highest combined federal and state corporate tax rate. 
  
R&DCredit Statutory rate at which firms may claim a R&D tax credit 
  
CorpCarryBack  The number of years which a firm can carry back a net operating loss in the state 
  
CorpCarryForward The number of years which a firm can carry forward a net operating loss in the state  
  
AverageResidentRate Total federal and state income tax paid by state residents scaled by total adjusted gross 
income of state residents (data through 2011). 
  
MargRate100K Combined federal and state marginal income tax rate on $100,000 in wage income, 
assuming the taxpayer is married filing jointly, and allowing for deductibility of state 
income taxes in states where applicable. 
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Figure 1. Efficient Project Frontier and Manager’s Indifference Curves 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This figure plots the efficient frontier of projects and a risk-averse manager’s indifference curves 
in pre-tax mean-variance space. The project’s pre-tax expected payoff (variance) appears on the 
y-axis (x-axis). The efficient frontier of available projects appears in blue. The solid red line 
represents the manager’s indifference curve at the point of tangency in the absence of taxes, t = 
0. The dashed red line represents the manager’s indifference curve at the point of tangency in the 
presence of a 40% tax rate, t = 0.40. In our example, φ = 5, θ = 1, α = 1 and β = 0.3. The point of 
tangency, for t = 0 is {2.33, 6.20}. The point of tangency for t = 0.40 is {4.55, 6.71}. 
t = 0.4 
t = 0 
μ 
σ2Δ = 2.22 
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Figure 2. Cross-Sectional Predictions 
 
 
Panel A. Marginal Benefit to Risk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B. Marginal Disutility to Risk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
μ 
t = 0.4 
t = 0 
σ2
μ 
t = 0.4 t = 0 
σ2
Δ = 3.55 
Δ = 1.11 
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This figure plots the efficient frontier of projects and a risk-averse manager’s indifference curves 
in pre-tax mean-variance space after altering the marginal benefit and marginal disutility to risk. 
The project’s pre-tax expected payoff (variance) appears on the y-axis (x-axis). The efficient 
frontier of available projects appears in blue. The solid red line represents the manager’s 
indifference curve at the point of tangency in the absence of taxes, t = 0. The dashed red line 
represents the manager’s indifference curve at the point of tangency in the presence of a 40% tax 
rate, t = 0.40. Panel A illustrates the effect of the marginal benefit of risk on the relation between 
taxes and project selection by increasing the slope of the efficient frontier from θ = 1 in Figure 1 
to θ = 1.6 (φ = 5, θ = 1.6, α = 1 and β = 0.3). The point of tangency for t = 0 is {4.33, 7.67}. The 
point of tangency for t = 0.40 is {7.88, 8.49}. Panel B illustrates the effect of the marginal cost of 
risk on the relation between taxes and project selection by increasing the manager’s risk aversion 
from β = 0.3 in Figure 1 to β = 0.6 (φ = 5, θ = 1, α = 1 and β = 0.6). The point of tangency, for t = 
0 is {0.66, 5.51}. The point of tangency for t = 0.40 is {1.77, 6.02}. 
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Figure 3. Manager’s Tax Rate and Corporate Decisions 
 
This figure illustrates the endogenous nature of the manager’s compensation with corporate 
decisions, and two channels through which the manager’s tax rate might affect corporate 
decisions: (i) directly, by reducing disutility associated with the adoption of risky projects, and 
(ii) indirectly, by altering the compensation and incentives the board provides to the manager.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manager’s 
Compensation and 
Equity Holdings 
 
Corporate 
Decisions 
 
Manager’s  
Tax Rate 
Direct Effect: 
Exogenous 
Indirect Effect: 
Endogenous 
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Figure 4. Number of Observations by State 
 
This figure presents the number of observations in our sample by state. The sample is comprised 
of 16,490 firm-years drawn from each of the 50 states, plus Washington D.C., from 1996 to 
2012. 
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Figure 5. Tax Rates by State 
 
This figure presents average values of ManagerRate, by state, for our sample of 16,490 firm-
years from 1996 to 2012. Managerial Tax Rate is the highest combined federal and state income 
tax rate, assuming that the manager works in the state of the firm’s headquarters, is married filing 
jointly, and allowing for reciprocal deductibility of federal and state taxes and $150,000 in 
property taxes. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A. Firm Characteristics 
Variable Mean Std 25th Median 75th 
Assets 6,397.28 27,288.71 422.86 1,156.14 3,594.60 
Leverage 0.22 0.19 0.04 0.20 0.33 
MB 2.09 1.52 1.22 1.61 2.35 
SalesGrowth 0.15 0.42 0.00 0.09 0.21 
CapIntensity 0.26 0.22 0.10 0.20 0.38 
Cash 0.16 0.18 0.03 0.09 0.24 
ROA 0.03 0.16 0.01 0.05 0.09 
Loss 0.20 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 
LossCarry 0.42 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Return 0.17 0.59 –0.17 0.09 0.37 
RetailOwn 0.28 0.22 0.11 0.24 0.41 
RiskyInvest 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.05 
 
 
Panel B. CEO Characteristics 
Variable Mean Std 25th Median 75th 
ManagerRate 0.41 0.03 0.39 0.41 0.43 
Age 55.39 7.31 50.00 55.00 60.00 
Tenure 7.20 7.47 2.00 5.00 10.00 
CashPay 1.14 1.05 0.54 0.83 1.29 
TotalPay 4.68 5.65 1.25 2.69 5.70 
Delta 0.70 1.58 0.08 0.22 0.60 
Vega 0.12 0.28 0.01 0.04 0.12 
 
 
Panel C. State Characteristics 
Variable Mean Std 25th Median 75th 
StateEconGrowth 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.04 
RepubGovernor 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 
RepubLegislature 0.31 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 
CorporateRate 0.40 0.02 0.38 0.40 0.41 
R&DCredit 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.10 
CorpCarryBack  0.69 1.09 0.00 0.00 2.00 
CorpCarryForward 13.61 6.47 7.00 15.00 20.00 
 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in our primary analysis. Our 
sample is constructed from the intersection of CRSP/Compustat (accounting and stock price 
data), Execucomp (compensation), and SEC EDGAR 10-K filings (historical data on state of 
headquarter’s), after excluding utilities (SIC codes 4900–4999) and financial firms (SIC codes 
6000–6999) over the time period 1996 to 2012. Our final sample covers a total of 16,490 firm-
years (2,202 firms and 3,891 managers). Panel A reports descriptive statistics for firm 
characteristics used in our analysis, Panel B reports descriptive statistics for manager 
characteristics, and Panel C reports descriptive statistics for characteristics of the firm’s state of 
headquarters. All variables are as defined in Appendix B. 
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Table 2. Managerial Tax Rates By Year 
 
  ManagerRate (combined Top Federal + Top State)  
Year N Mean Std 25th Median 75th 
Top Federal 
Rate Only  
1996 836 0.44 0.02 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.396  
1997 935 0.44 0.02 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.396  
1998 885 0.44 0.02 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.396  
1999 940 0.44 0.02 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.396  
2000 981 0.44 0.02 0.43 0.44 0.46 0.396  
2001 945 0.44 0.02 0.42 0.44 0.45 0.391  
2002 929 0.43 0.02 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.386 Bush Tax Cuts 
2003 980 0.40 0.02 0.38 0.40 0.41 0.350  
2004 927 0.40 0.02 0.38 0.40 0.41 0.350  
2005 950 0.40 0.02 0.38 0.40 0.41 0.350  
2006 978 0.39 0.02 0.38 0.39 0.41 0.350  
2007 1,073 0.39 0.02 0.38 0.39 0.40 0.350  
2008 1,125 0.39 0.02 0.37 0.39 0.40 0.350  
2009 1,026 0.39 0.02 0.37 0.39 0.41 0.350  
2010 1,023 0.39 0.02 0.37 0.39 0.41 0.350  
2011 1,056 0.39 0.02 0.37 0.39 0.41 0.350  
2012 901 0.39 0.03 0.37 0.39 0.39 0.350  
Total 16,490 0.41 0.03 0.39 0.41 0.43   
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for ManagerRate, by year, for our sample of 16,490 
firm-years. ManagerRate is the highest combined federal and state income tax rate, assuming the 
individual is in top brackets at both the federal and state levels, married filing jointly with 
$150,000 in deductible property taxes, and allowing for reciprocal deductibility of state and 
federal income taxes in states where applicable. 
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Table 3. Managerial Taxes and Corporate Risk-Taking: Between-Group Analysis 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 No Controls Firm Characteristics 
Firm and Manager 
Characteristics 
Firm, Manager, and 
State Characteristics 
Federal and State 
Components 
Variable: coeff t-stat coeff t-stat coeff t-stat coeff t-stat coeff t-stat 
ManagerRate 0.439*** (2.51) 0.246*** (5.34) 0.237*** (5.25) 0.135*** (2.99) .  
ManagerRate_Fed .  .  .  .  0.190*** (2.65) 
ManagerRate_State .  .  .  .  0.100* (1.94) 
           
Firm-Year Controls           
Log(Assets) .  –0.001** (–1.14) –0.003** (–2.49) –0.002** (–2.32) –0.002** (–2.23) 
Leverage .  –0.020*** (–3.64) –0.020*** (–3.51) –0.018*** (–3.18) –0.017*** (–3.10) 
MB .  0.007*** (6.32) 0.007*** (7.07) 0.007*** (7.40) 0.007*** (7.47) 
SalesGrowth .  0.007* (1.60) 0.007* (1.83) 0.007* (1.70) 0.007* (1.71) 
CapIntensity .  –0.020*** (–4.83) –0.018*** (–4.29) –0.016*** (–4.21) –0.016*** (–4.02) 
Cash .  0.136*** (9.69) 0.135*** (10.09) 0.125*** (9.66) 0.125*** (9.38) 
ROA .  –0.124*** (–6.65) –0.122*** (–6.59) –0.119*** (–6.35) –0.119*** (–6.36) 
Loss .  0.004 (1.24) 0.004 (1.18) 0.004 (1.21) 0.004 (1.18) 
LossCarry .  0.009*** (2.65) 0.009*** (2.71) 0.007*** (2.59) 0.007** (2.50) 
Return .  –0.007***  (–4.42) –0.006***  (–4.31) –0.006***  (–3.94) –0.006*** (–4.02) 
RetailOwn .  0.001 (0.13) 0.003 (0.55) 0.006 (0.94) 0.006 (1.02) 
           
Manager-Year Controls           
Log(Age) .  .  –0.001 (–0.16) –0.001 (–0.08) –0.001 (–0.10) 
Log(Tenure) .  .  0.001 (0.31) 0.001 (0.38) 0.001 (0.35) 
Log(CashPay) .  .  –0.001 (–0.32) –0.001 (–0.23) –0.001 (–0.24) 
Log(Delta) .  .  –0.012*** (–3.30) –0.012*** (–3.29) –0.012*** (–3.27) 
Log(Vega) .  .  0.057*** (7.26) 0.052*** (6.90) 0.052*** (6.69) 
           
State-Year Controls           
StateEconGrowth .  .  .  0.043*** (2.35) 0.047*** (2.59) 
RepubGovernor .  .  .  –0.001 (–0.03) 0.001 (0.30) 
RepubLegislature .  .  .  –0.005** (–2.47) –0.005** (–2.30) 
CorporateRate .  .  .  0.110 (1.40) 0.091 (1.06) 
R&DCredit .  .  .  0.087*** (4.03) 0.080*** (3.41) 
CorpCarryBack  .  .  .  –0.002** (–1.74) –0.002* (–1.81) 
CorpCarryForward .  .  .  –0.001 (–1.13) 0.001 (–1.24) 
F / N  56.21 / 16,490 142.15 / 16,490 118.56 / 16,490 104.91 / 16,490 101.98 / 16,490 
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This table presents results from estimating Eq. (8) using a between-group design. Columns (1) through (4) present results from 
progressively including firm-, manager-, and state-level control variables. Column (5) presents results from additively decomposing 
ManagerRate into the federal tax component, ManagerRate_Fed, and the state tax component ManagerRate_State. ManagerRate_Fed 
is the rate on the top federal income tax bracket, and ManagerRate_State is the difference between ManagerRate and 
ManagerRate_Fed. All variables are as defined in Appendix B. t-statistics appear in parentheses and are based on standard errors 
clustered by state and year. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two-tail), respectively. 
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Table 4. Managerial Taxes and Corporate Risk-Taking: Within-Group Analysis 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Within-Year: 
 
 
Year  
Fixed Effects 
Within-State: 
 
 
Year and State  
Fixed Effects 
Within-Firm: 
 
 
Year, State, and Firm  
Fixed Effects 
Within-Manager: 
 
Year, State, Firm, 
and Manager 
Fixed Effects 
Time-varying  
industry shocks: 
 
Industry-Year, State, 
Firm, and Manager 
Fixed Effects 
Variable: coeff t-stat coeff t-stat coeff t-stat coeff t-stat coeff t-stat 
ManagerRate 0.203*** (2.74) 0.254*** (3.00) 0.347*** (6.51) 0.237*** (3.89) 0.290*** (3.72) 
           
Firm-Year Controls           
Log(Assets) –0.003** (–2.52) –0.003** (–2.51) –0.008** (–2.23) –0.006** (–2.51) –0.007*** (–3.00) 
Leverage –0.017*** (–3.04) –0.017*** (–2.98) –0.012*** (–3.51) –0.015*** (–1.81) –0.013* (–1.69) 
MB 0.007*** (6.79) 0.007*** (6.95) –0.001 (–0.25) –0.001 (–0.43) –0.001 (–0.52) 
SalesGrowth 0.006 (1.59) 0.006 (1.46) 0.003* (1.68) 0.003 (1.38) 0.002 (1.05) 
CapIntensity –0.015*** (–3.79) –0.011*** (–2.72) 0.030*** (3.97) 0.025*** (3.01) 0.030*** (3.90) 
Cash 0.126*** (9.29) 0.119*** (7.63) 0.006 (0.61) 0.015* (1.64) 0.015* (1.64) 
ROA –0.120*** (–6.21) –0.118*** (–5.91) –0.024*** (–3.27) –0.019** (–1.98) –0.020** (–2.28) 
Loss 0.004 (1.30) 0.004 (1.11) 0.001 (0.68) 0.001  (1.02) 0.001 (0.62) 
LossCarry 0.007** (2.34) 0.007** (2.29) 0.001 (0.08) –0.001 (–0.35) –0.001 (–0.41) 
Return –0.006*** (–3.06) –0.006***  (–3.26) –0.003**  (–2.49) –0.002** (–2.41) –0.002** (–2.47) 
RetailOwn 0.006 (0.93) 0.009 (1.55) 0.002 (0.57) 0.005 (1.48) 0.004 (1.39) 
           
Manager-Year Controls           
Log(Age) –0.001 (–0.02) –0.003 (–0.39) –0.010** (–2.06) 0.003 (0.34) –0.001 (–0.02) 
Log(Tenure) 0.001 (–1.55) 0.001 (0.26) –0.001 (–0.87) –0.003 (–1.33) –0.003 (–1.55) 
Log(CashPay) 0.001 (1.58) 0.002 (0.57) 0.005*** (2.71) 0.003* (1.90) 0.003 (1.58) 
Log(Delta) –0.011*** (–3.18) –0.012*** (–3.22) 0.001 (0.70) –0.001 (–0.12) –0.001 (–0.10) 
Log(Vega) 0.054*** (6.63) 0.053*** (6.01) 0.002 (0.44) 0.001 (0.32) 0.006 (0.87) 
           
State-Year Controls           
StateEconGrowth –0.001 (–0.03) 0.031 (–1.14) –0.027 (–1.55) –0.015 (–0.96) –0.018 (–1.33) 
RepubGovernor 0.001 (0.25) –0.002 (1.09) 0.001 (0.62) –0.001 (–0.53) –0.001 (–0.28) 
RepubLegislature –0.004* (–1.89) 0.003** (2.17) 0.001 (1.80) 0.001 (1.19) 0.001 (1.09) 
CorporateRate 0.065 (0.66) 0.073 (0.64) –0.008 (–0.32) –0.054* (–1.73) –0.073 (–1.22) 
R&DCredit 0.085*** (3.34) 0.014 (0.59) 0.028 (1.37) 0.022 (1.18) 0.022 (0.96) 
CorpCarryBack  –0.002* (–1.95) 0.001 (0.61) 0.001 (0.16) 0.001 (0.66) 0.001 (1.13) 
CorpCarryForward –0.001 (–0.94) 0.001 (0.52) –0.001 (–0.17) –0.001 (–1.10) –0.001 (–1.21) 
F / N  773.91 / 16,490 125.19 / 16,489 17.11 / 16,231 7.70 / 15,461 35.00 / 15,324 
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This table presents results from estimating Eq. (9) using a within-group design that incorporates various levels of fixed effects. 
Column (1) presents results from a within-year analysis that includes year effects. Column (2) presents results from a within-state 
analysis that includes both year and state effects. Column (3) presents results from a within-firm analysis that includes year, state, and 
firm effects. Column (4) presents results from a within-manager analysis that includes year, state, firm, and manager effects. Column 
(5) presents results from replacing year effects with industry-year effects, where industry-year effects are based on two-digit SIC 
codes. For parsimony, we do not tabulate coefficients on control variables. All variables are as defined in Appendix B. t-statistics 
appear in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered by state and year. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two-tail), respectively. 
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Table 5. Cross-Sectional Tests: Returns to an Additional Unit of Risk 
 
Panel A. Tobin’s Q 
 
(1) 
 
Low Return per 
Unit of Risk 
 
 
Industry Q ≤ 1.49 
(2) 
 
High Return per 
Unit of Risk 
 
 
Industry Q > 1.49 
   
Mean RiskyInvest 0.022  0.053  
   
Variable   
ManagerRate –0.006 0.464*** 
 (–0.14) (3.15) 
Time–Varying Controls   
        Firm–Year Yes Yes 
        State–Year Yes Yes 
        Manager–Year Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects   
        Year Yes Yes 
        State Yes Yes 
        Firm Yes Yes 
        Manager Yes Yes 
F / N 18.38 / 7,476 16.62 / 7,303  
Panel B. Slope of the Investment Opportunity Set 
 
(1) 
 
Low Return per 
Unit of Risk 
 
 
Industry θ ≤ 1.70 
(2) 
 
High Return per 
Unit of Risk 
 
 
Industry θ > 1.70 
   
Mean RiskyInvest 0.033  0.042  
   
Variable1   
ManagerRate 0.170* 0.338*** 
 (1.96) (3.21) 
Time–Varying Controls   
        Firm–Year Yes Yes 
        State–Year Yes Yes 
        Manager–Year Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects   
        Year Yes Yes 
        State Yes Yes 
        Firm Yes Yes 
        Manager Yes Yes 
F / N 43.21 / 7,178 25.02 / 6,990  
 
This table presents results from estimating whether the effect of managerial taxes on corporate risk-taking varies with two measures of 
the return to an additional unit of risk: industry growth opportunities, Industry Q, and the slope coefficient of the investment 
opportunity set for the industry given in Eq. (3), Industry θ. Industry Q is calculated as market value of equity plus book value of debt 
scaled by book value of assets, where numerator and denominator are aggregated over all firms in the respective industry-year. Larger 
values of Industry Q correspond to industries with more growth opportunities. Industry θ is the slope coefficient from regression of 
buy-and-hold return over the year on the natural log of one plus the variance of monthly returns, and regressions are estimated  
separately for each industry-year. Larger values of Industry θ correspond to a larger return for each additional unit of risk. We estimate 
Eq. (9) separately for firms with above and below median values of these variables, and allow the coefficients on all control variables 
and fixed effects to vary across the two groups of firms. All variables are as defined in Appendix B. t–statistics appear in parentheses 
and are based on standard errors clustered by state and year. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
levels (two–tail), respectively.  
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Table 6. Cross-Sectional Tests: Disutility to an Additional Unit of Risk 
 
Panel A. Sensitivity of Portfolio to Stock Price 
 
(1) 
 
High Disutility: 
 
Delta > 0.22 
(2) 
 
Low Disutility: 
 
Delta ≤ 0.22 
   
Mean RiskyInvest 0.033  0.042  
   
Variable   
ManagerRate –0.091 0.701*** 
 (–1.32) (4.54) 
Time–Varying Controls   
        Firm–Year Yes Yes 
        State–Year Yes Yes 
        Manager–Year Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects   
        Year Yes Yes 
        State Yes Yes 
        Firm Yes Yes 
        Manager Yes Yes 
F / N 7.80 / 7,303 12.15 / 7,476  
Panel B. CEO Age 
 
(1) 
 
High Disutility: 
 
Age > 55 
(2) 
 
Low Disutility: 
 
Age ≤ 55 
   
Mean RiskyInvest 0.030  0.044  
   
Variable   
ManagerRate 0.275*** 0.420*** 
 (2.68) (2.96) 
Time–Varying Controls   
        Firm–Year Yes Yes 
        State–Year Yes Yes 
        Manager–Year Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects   
        Year Yes Yes 
        State Yes Yes 
        Firm Yes Yes 
        Manager No No 
F / N 12.59 / 7,303 38.08 / 7,476  
 
This table presents results from estimating whether the effect of managerial taxes on corporate risk-taking varies with two measures of 
the disutility to an additional unit of risk: the sensitivity of the value of the CEO’s equity portfolio to a 1% change in stock price 
(Delta) and the CEO’s age in years (Age). Larger values of Delta and Age correspond to greater disutility for each additional unit of 
risk. We estimate Eq. (9) separately for CEOs with above and below median values of these variables, and allow the coefficients on all 
control variables and fixed effects to vary across the two groups of firms. We exclude manager fixed effects when estimating whether 
the effect of taxes varies with manager age. All variables are as defined in Appendix B. t-statistics appear in parentheses and are based 
on standard errors clustered by state and year. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two–tail), 
respectively.  
 62
Table 7. Whose Taxes? Tax Rates on Non-Management Employees 
 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std 25th Median 75th 
AverageResidentRate 0.15 0.02 0.14 0.15 0.16 
MargRate100K 0.31 0.04 0.28 0.31 0.34 
 
Panel B. Correlation matrix 
Variable ManagerRate AverageResidentRate MargRate100K 
ManagerRate 1.00 0.80 0.82 
AverageResidentRate 0.78 1.00 0.78 
MargRate100K 0.82 0.76 1.00 
 
Panel C. Regression results 
 NonManagerRate = 
 
AverageResidentRate:  
Average taxes paid by state residents scaled by average 
state household income 
MargRate100K: 
Tax rate on family of four 
with income of $100,000 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ManagerRate . . 0.175** 0.224** . . 0.152** 0.212*** 
 . . (2.44) (2.09) . . (2.42) (3.15) 
NonManagerRate 0.166* 0.159 –0.084 0.009 0.072 0.161 –0.02 0.125 
 (1.74) (0.64) (–0.48) (0.03) (1.39) (1.45) (–0.40) (1.08) 
Time-Varying Controls         
        Firm-level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        Manager-level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        State-level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects         
        Year No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
        State No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
        Firm No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
        Manager No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
F 95.60 30.98 87.05 32.75 108.8 7.73 100.88 7.25 
N 15,589 14,598 15,589 14,598 16,490 15,461 16,490 15,461 
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This table presents results from estimating Eq. (9) replacing the tax rate on senior managers with either the average tax rate paid by 
state residents (AverageResidentRate) or the combined federal and state marginal tax rate on $100,000 in wage income 
(MargRate100K). All variables are as defined in Appendix B. Panel A presents descriptive statistics, Panel B presents the correlation 
matrix with Pearson (Spearman) correlations above (below) the diagonal, and Panel C presents regression results. t-statistics appear in 
parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered by state and year. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 
and 0.10 levels (two-tail), respectively.  
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Table 8. Alternative Measures of Risky Investment 
 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std 25th Median 75th 
EarnVol 0.061 0.189 0.003 0.008 0.032 
IdVol 0.872 1.160 0.224 0.470 1.006 
SysVol 1.135 1.706 0.251 0.567 1.238 
 
 
Panel B. Multivariate Regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable EarnVol IdVol SysVol 
ManagerRate 2.920** 12.573*** 4.472 
 (2.26) (3.28) (0.62) 
Time-Varying Controls:    
     Firm-level Yes Yes Yes 
     State-level Yes Yes Yes 
     Manager-level Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects:    
     Year Yes Yes Yes 
     State Yes Yes Yes 
     Firm Yes Yes Yes 
     Manager Yes Yes Yes 
    
F / N 21.20 / 15,382 14.60 / 15,382 51.93 / 15,382 
 
This table presents results from estimating Eq. (9) using three alternative measures of risk-
taking: Earnings Volatility, Idiosyncratic Volatility, and Systematic Volatility. Panel A presents 
descriptive statistics for each of the three alternative measures and Panel B presents regression 
results. For parsimony, we do not tabulate coefficients on control variables. t-statistics appear in 
parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered by state and year. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two-tail), respectively. 
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Internet Appendix 
 
This appendix outlines results from additional analyses. 
 
Table IA.1 Effect of firm performance on tax rate paid by senior managers 
 
 Table IA.1 presents results from examining the percentage of firm-years where the 
CEO’s salary exceeds the threshold needed to qualify for the highest state income tax bracket. 
Using historical data on state income thresholds from the Tax Policy Center from 2000 to 2012 
(http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/state-individual-income-tax-rates-2000-2016), we code 
an indicator variable, CEOTopBracket, equal to one if the CEO’s salary in that year is sufficient 
to qualify the CEO for the state tax rate used in our primary analysis (i.e., the rate for the highest 
state income tax bracket). By definition, CEOTopBracket, is coded as one for states with a single 
tax rate for all taxpayers and for states with no income tax, as all CEOs in such states would 
qualify for that rate.  
 
 Panel A presents the percentage of observations where the CEO’s salary exceeds the 
threshold needed to qualify for the highest state income tax bracket (i.e., CEOTopBracket = 1).43 
Results in Panel A suggests that the base salary of nearly all top managers in our sample is 
sufficient to put them in the top bracket––regardless of the performance of their firm. Panel B 
presents the percentage of observations where the CEO’s salary exceeds the income threshold 
separately for firm-years with profits and losses (i.e., Loss = 1). The CEO appears in the highest 
tax bracket for 96.59% of loss firms and 97.16% of profitable firms, a difference of 0.57% (p-
value  = 0.13). Panel C presents results from using a linear probability model to estimate the 
probability that the CEO’s salary qualifies for the top bracket as a function on accounting and 
stock performance (ROA, Loss, and Return). We find no evidence of a relation between firm 
performance and the manager’s tax bracket. Collectively, these finding support the notion (and 
our maintained assumption) that managers’ personal income tax rates are invariant with respect 
to their firm’s performance or corporate tax situation––managers are almost always taxed at the 
highest rate. 
 
Table IA.2 Manager Tax Rates and Compensation 
 
Table IA.2 shows results from examining the relation between manager tax rates and 
manager compensation. Columns (1), (2), and (3) present results from a regression of CEO cash 
compensation (CashPay) and portfolio equity incentives (Delta and Vega) on the CEO’s tax rate. 
Regression specifications follow specification #4 in Table 4 and include the full set of firm-year 
controls, manager characteristics, state-year controls, and fixed effects. We find no evidence of a 
relation between tax rates and any of these incentive variables (t-stats 0.51, –0.65, and 1.35 
respectively). Prior literature finds no evidence that boards alter managerial compensation in 
response to federal income taxes, and these results suggest boards also do not appear to alter 
incentive-compensation contracts in response to state income taxes. 
 
 
                                                 
43 Our sample is reduced to 11,913 firm-years from 2000 to 2013 and we have no firm-years for Vermont or North 
Dakota over this period. 
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Table IA.3 Alternative Tax Rate: No Itemized Deductions 
 
 In the calculation of ManagerRate we assumed $150,000 in itemized deductions (e.g., 
property taxes). Table IA.3 presents results from estimating Eq (9). using an alternative tax rate 
that is calculated analogously, but assuming no itemized deductions (ManagerRate_NoDeduct). 
Specifically, ManagerRate_NoDeduct is the combined marginal tax rate on personal income for 
individuals in the highest federal and state tax bracket ($1.5 million income). The rate is 
calculated assuming that managers pay income taxes in the state of the firm’s principal executive 
offices, are married filing jointly and allowing for the reciprocal deductibility of federal and state 
income taxes where applicable. Panel A shows a very high, 0.99 correlation between 
ManagerRate and ManagerRate_NoDeduct suggesting the presence of itemized deductions does 
not materially affect the calculated rates. Panel B presents regression results. Regression 
specifications follow specification #4 in Table 4. Panel B shows that the coefficient is attenuated 
(coefficient of 0.162 versus 0.237 in Table 4) but statistical significant is increased (t-statistic of 
4.45 versus 3.89 in Table 4). 
 
Table IA.4 Additional State-Level Control Variables 
 
Table IA.4 presents results from repeating our primary analyses after including several 
additional time-varying state-level controls. We include the following additional state-level 
controls variables. RealEstateIndex is end-of-year housing price index compiled by the Federal 
Housing Authority for the respective state-year.44 CapitalCredit is the rate at which a firm can 
deduct capital expenditures directly from its state corporate income tax liability in addition to the 
usual depreciation deductions against taxable income.45 JobCredit is an indicator variable equal 
to one if the state offers a tax credit in return for hiring new workers and zero otherwise.46 
UnemploymentRate is the state unemployment rate, in percent.47 Resident_Bachelor is the 
number of individuals with at least a bachelor’s degree scaled by state population.48 
Resident_TopEarner is the number of tax returns listing adjusted gross income in excess of 
$200,000 scaled by state population.49  
  
 The resulting “saturated models” include a total of 11 firm-year controls, 5 manager-year 
controls, and 13 state-level controls––the 7 state-level controls from our primary analyses (e.g., 
StateEconGrowth, RepubGovernor, RepubLegislature, CorporateRate, R&DCredit, 
CorpCarryBack, CorpCarryForward) and 6 additional state-level variables described above. 
With regard to these additional variables, results in column (1) suggest the provision of capital 
expenditure credits are negatively related to risk-taking and state unemployment rate is positively 
related to risk-taking (t-stats of –2.09 and 1.94 respectively). However, consistent with the 
results from our primary analysis, column (2) reports that none of the 13 time-varying state-level 
controls are statistically significant at conventional levels in the within-group analysis that 
                                                 
44 Data are available at https://www.fhfa.gov/KeyTopics/Pages/House-Price-Index.aspx. 
45 Data on CapitalCredit through 2006 were provided by Chirinko and Wilson (2008), and data for subsequent years 
come from tax forms available on State Department of Revenue websites (see, Ljungqvist et al., 2016). 
46 Data are from Appendix A1 in Neumark and Grijalva (2016). 
47 Data are available at https://beta.bls.gov/dataQuery/find?q=unemployment 
48 Date come from the US Census and are available at https://www.census.gov/support/USACdataDownloads.html. 
We use a state-specific linear trend to interpolate state populations between census years. 
49 Data are available at https://www.irs.gov/uac/soi-tax-stats-historic-table-2. 
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includes state-level fixed effects. Regardless of specification, we find our inferences regarding 
the relation between the manager’s tax rate and corporate risk-taking is unaffected (ManagerRate 
t-stats of 3.90 and 3.01). 
 
Table IA.5 Differential Effect of Retroactively Applied Tax Rates 
 
 Table IA.5 presents results from estimating Eq. (9) distinguishing tax rates that were 
retroactively applied. In some instances, legislatures pass tax changes that apply retroactively 
rather than prospectively. We find that retroactive rates affect 393 firm-years in our sample, 
suggesting that retroactively applied tax legislation is relatively rare. Moreover, we find that all 
retroactive rates in our sample apply to the current year (i.e., year t tax rate), leaving managers 
with time to respond even if they were unaware of the pending legislation until after it was 
passed. For example, in May 2009 the Hawaiian governor approved tax legislation that was 
retroactive to January 2009. 
 
 To examine whether there is a differential effect of retroactive rates, we estimate Eq. (9) 
after including: (i) an indicator variable equal to one if the state tax rate in year t was retroactive 
(RetroActive) and (ii) the interaction between the indicator and ManagerRate 
(RetroActive*ManagerRate). In this manner, the total effect of a retroactive rate will be the sum 
of the coefficient on the tax rate (i.e., the main effect) and the interaction term. Table IA.5 
reports that the interaction term is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that 
retroactive tax rates have less of an effect. 
 
Table IA.6 Large and Small Increases and Decreases 
 
 Table IA.6 presents results from estimating Eq. (9) after decomposing ManagerRatet into 
its lagged value (ManagerRatet-1) and the change during the year (ΔManagerRatet) as follows: 
 
ManagerRatet = ManagerRatet-1 + ΔManagerRatet  
 
where 
 
ΔManagerRatet = ΔLg+ ManagerRatet + ΔSm+ ManagerRatet  
  + ΔLg– ManagerRatet + ΔSm– ManagerRatet 
 
ΔLg– ManagerRatet is the change in tax rate if it is less than –75 basis points; ΔSm– ManagerRatet 
is the change in tax rate if it is between–75 and zero basis points; ΔSm+ ManagerRatet is the 
change in tax rate if it is between zero and 75 basis points; and ΔLg+ ManagerRatet is the change 
in tax rate if it is greater than 75 basis points. Table IA.6 reports that the coefficients on small 
increases and decreases are tiny and statistically insignificant, consistent with managers not 
responding to small rate changes. In contrast, the coefficient on large increases is statistically 
significant, while the coefficient on large decreases is of similar magnitude to that of large 
increases, but is not statistically different from zero. F-tests fail to reject a difference in the 
magnitudes of the coefficients on large increases and large decreases (p-value 0.74). We interpret 
these results as being consistent with a lack of power in the latter setting since there are fewer 
large decreases than large increases. 
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Table IA.7 Timing Tests 
 
Table IA.7 presents results from estimation Eq. (9) after including three-years of leads 
and lags of ManagerRate. Specifically, we estimate: 
 
RiskyInvestt+1 = γ0 + γ1ManagerRatet  
 + γ2ManagerRatet–1 + γ3ManagerRatet–2 + γ4ManagerRatet–3                           
 + γ5ManagerRatet+1 + γ6ManagerRatet+2 + γ7ManagerRatet+3       
        + Ω Controls + θ Fixed Effects + εt 
 
This lead-lag specification is commonly used to assess the validity of assumptions related to 
timing and parallel trends (e.g., Ljungqvist et al., 2017). In this specification, the coefficient on 
each ManagerRate variable represents an incremental effect. We find that ManagerRatet remains 
statistically significant at conventional levels, and that all lead and lags are insignificant at 
conventional levels. Finding that the coefficients on the lead terms are not statistically signficiant 
suggests that corporate risk-taking exhibits parallel trends. Finding that the coefficients on the 
lead terms are not statistically significant suggests that corporate risk-taking exhibits parallel 
trends. For example, if managers reversed the increase in risk, then tax rate in t would be 
positively correlated with risk, but tax rates in t–1, ..., t–3 would be negatively correlated with 
risk. 
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Table IA.1 Effect of Firm Performance on Tax Rate Paid by Senior Managers 
 
 
Panel A. Percentage of Observations where the CEO’s Salary Exceeds  
the Threshold to Qualify for the Highest State Bracket 
AK 100% GA 100% MD 78% NJ 76% SD 100% 
AL 100% HI 100% ME 100% NM 100% TN 100% 
AR 100% IA 97% MI 100% NV 100% TX 100% 
AZ 99% ID 100% MN 99% NY 85% UT 98% 
CA 98% IL 100% MO 96% OH 99% VA 100% 
CO 100% IN 100% MS 100% OK 100% WA 100% 
CT 95% KS 100% MT 100% OR 100% WI 98% 
DC 100% KY 100% NC 100% PA 100% WV 100% 
DE 100% LA 100% NE 100% RI 95% WY 100% 
FL 100% MA 100% NH 100% SC 97% VT & ND N/A 
Total Number of Observations 11,913; Total Percentage of Observations In Excess of Threshold: 97% 
 
 
 
Panel B. Corporate Losses and CEO Tax Bracket 
Loss Firm 
Percentage of Observations where the CEO’s Salary Exceeds 
the Threshold to Qualify for the Highest State Bracket 
Yes (N = 2550 firm-years) 96.59% ( N = 2,463) 
No (N = 9,363 firm-years) 97.16% ( N = 9,097) 
Difference 0.57% p-value test of differences: 0.13 
 
 
 
Panel C. Effect of Firm Performance on CEO Tax Bracket 
 
(1) 
Between Group Analysis 
(2) 
Within-Group Analysis 
Variable coeff t-stat coeff t-stat 
ROA 0.017 (1.10) –0.004 (–0.17) 
Loss –0.004 (–1.02) –0.002 (–0.28) 
Return –0.012 (–1.28) –0.001 (–0.52) 
Fixed Effects:   
     Year No Yes 
     State No Yes 
     Firm No Yes 
     Manager No Yes 
F / N 1.97 / 11,913 0.12 / 11,128 
 
This table shows results from examining the percentage of firm-years where the CEO’s salary 
exceeds the threshold needed to qualify for the highest state income tax bracket. Using historical 
data on the state income thresholds from the Tax Policy Center from 2000 to 2012 
(http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/state-individual-income-tax-rates-2000-2016), we code 
an indicator variable, CEOTopBracket, equal to one if the CEO’s salary in that year exceeds the 
respective income threshold to qualify for the state tax rate used in our primary analysis (the 
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highest state income tax bracket). CEOTopBracket is coded as one for states with a single tax 
rate for all taxpayers. Sample of 11,913 firm-years from 2000 to 2013. Panel A presents the 
percentage of observations where the CEO’s salary exceeds the income threshold by state (i.e., 
CEOTopBracket = 1). We have no firm-years for Vermont or North Dakota over this period. 
Panel B presents the percentage of observations where the CEO’s salary exceeds the income 
threshold separately for loss firms. Panel C presents results from using a linear probability model 
to estimate the probability that the CEO’s salary qualifies for the top bracket as a function on 
accounting and stock performance (ROA, Loss, and Return). All variables are as defined in 
Appendix B. t-statistics appear in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered by state 
and year. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two-tail), 
respectively. 
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Table IA.2 Manager Tax Rates and Compensation 
 
 
 Dependent Variable: 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Log(CashPay) Log(Delta) Log(Vega) 
Variable: Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
ManagerRate –0.569 (0.51) –0.569 (–0.65) 0.378 (1.35) 
       
Firm-Year Controls       
Log(Assets) 0.098*** (5.41) 0.198*** (9.85) –0.031*** (4.68) 
Leverage –0.175*** (–6.01) –0.161*** (–4.20) –0.032 (–1.20) 
MB 0.015*** (3.41) 0.075*** (13.27) 0.004** (2.07) 
SalesGrowth 0.021 (1.62) 0.010 (1.22) 0.001 (0.24) 
CapIntensity –0.066 (–1.38) 0.013 (0.22) –0.006*** (–0.24) 
Cash –0.050 (–1.52) –0.011 (–0.26) 0.004*** (0.57) 
ROA –0.036 (0.90) –0.005 (–0.13) 0.013* (1.78) 
Loss –0.046*** (–3.28) –0.038*** (–3.67) –0.011*** (–3.06) 
LossCarry –0.001 (–0.01) –0.017 (–1.23) –0.003 (–0.88) 
Return 0.026*** (2.97) 0.042*** (4.66) –0.002 (–0.97) 
RetailOwn 0.012 (0.36) 0.084** (2.01) 0.016 (1.36) 
       
Manager-Year Controls       
Log(Age) 0.035 (0.36) 0.351 (1.53) 0.063** (2.54) 
Log(Tenure) 0.018 (1.19) 0.055*** (4.25) 0.026*** (3.61) 
       
State-Year Controls       
StateEconGrowth 0.222 (1.59) 0.232 (1.42) 0.102* (1.80) 
RepubGovernor –0.001 (–0.03) –0.014 (–1.56) –0.001 (–0.28) 
RepubLegislature 0.022* (1.66) –0.015* (–1.64) –0.001 (–0.05) 
CorporateRate –0.002 (–0.01) 0.454 (0.82) –0.083 (–0.48) 
R&DCredit 0.268 (1.42) 0.046 (0.21) 0.074 (0.86) 
CorpCarryBack  –0.002 (–0.21) 0.003 (0.35) 0.002 (0.42) 
CorpCarryForward –0.001 (–0.50) 0.001 (1.07) –0.001 (–0.14) 
Fixed Effects:    
     Year Yes Yes Yes 
     State Yes Yes Yes 
     Firm Yes Yes Yes 
     Manager Yes Yes Yes 
F / N  34.60 / 15,461 131.17 / 15,461 50.30 / 15,461 
 
This table presents results from examining the relation between managerial compensation and 
managerial tax rate. Column (1) presents results from a regression of cash compensation 
(CashPay) on the manager’s total tax rate and control variables. Column (2) presents results 
from regressions of equity incentives as it relates to price (Delta) on the manager’s total tax rate 
and control variables. Column (3) presents results from regressions of equity incentives as it 
relates to risk (Vega) on the manager’s total tax rate and control variables. Consistent with our 
primary analyses, all regression specifications include year, state, firm, and manager fixed 
effects. All variables are as defined in Appendix B. t-statistics appear in parentheses and are 
based on standard errors clustered by state and year. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 
the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two-tail), respectively. 
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Table IA.3 Alternative Tax Rate: No Itemized Deductions 
 
 
Panel A. Correlation Between Rates 
Variable ManagerRate ManagerRate_NoDeduct 
ManagerRate 1.00 0.99 
ManagerRate_NoDeduct 0.99 1.00 
 
 
Panel B. Regression results 
Variable Coeff. t-stat 
ManagerRate_NoDeduct 0.162*** (4.45) 
Time-Varying Controls:  
     Firm-level Yes 
     State-level Yes 
     Manager-level Yes 
Fixed Effects:  
     Year Yes 
     State Yes 
     Firm Yes 
     Manager Yes 
F / N 5.93 / 15,461 
 
 
This table presents results from using an alternative tax rate that assumes zero itemized 
deductions (ManagerRate_NoDeduct). ManagerRate_NoDeduct is the combined marginal tax 
rate on personal income for individuals in the highest federal and state tax bracket ($1.5 million 
income). The rate is calculated assuming that managers pay income taxes in the state of the 
firm’s principal executive offices, are married filing jointly and allowing for the reciprocal 
deductibility of federal and state income taxes where applicable. Panel A presents the correlation 
between this alternative rate and the rate used in our analysis (which is calculated analogously 
but assuming $150,000 in itemized deductions). Panel B presents results from estimating Eq. (9) 
using ManagerRate_NoDeduct. Regression specifications follow column (4) in Table 4. t-
statistics appear in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered by state and year. ***, 
**, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two-tail), respectively. 
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Table IA.4 Alternative Specification: Additional State-Level Control Variables 
 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std 25th Median 75th 
RealEstateIndex 327.871 130.642 226.810 292.480 396.820 
CapitalCredit 0.017 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.030 
JobCredit 0.743 0.436 0.000 1.000 1.000 
UnemploymentRate 6.015 2.076 4.600 5.400 6.800 
Resident_Bachelors 0.204 0.057 0.161 0.189 0.234 
Resident_TopEarners 0.006 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.009 
 
 
Panel B. Regression Results 
 
(1) 
Between Group 
Analysis 
(2) 
Within Group  
Analysis 
Variable Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
ManagerRate 0.217*** (3.01) 0.217*** (3.01) 
Additional State-Year Controls     
RealEstateIndex 0.001 (1.48) –0.001 (–0.17) 
CapitalCredit –0.067** (–2.09) 0.035 (1.03) 
JobCredit –0.001 (–0.48) 0.001 (0.43) 
UnemploymentRate 0.001* (1.94) –0.001 (–0.53) 
Resident_Bachelors 0.033 (0.96) 0.047 (0.27) 
Resident_TopEarners –0.225 (–0.31) 0.719 (0.66) 
Time-Varying Controls:   
     Firm-level Yes Yes 
     State-level Yes Yes 
     Manager-level Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects:   
     Year No Yes 
     State No Yes 
     Firm No Yes 
     Manager No Yes 
F / N 102.84 / 16,490 18.17 / 15,461 
 
 
This table presents results from repeating our analysis after including several additional time 
varying state-level controls. We include the following additional state-level controls variables: an 
index of state real estate value (RealEstateIndex), an indicator for whether the state offered an 
investment tax credit in the respective year (CapitalCredit), an indicator for whether the state 
offered tax credit for job creation in the respective year (JobCredit), the state unemployment rate 
(UnemploymentRate), the percent of state residents with bachelor’s degrees (Resident_Bachelor) 
and the percentage of state residents filing taxes in the top state and federal brackets 
(Resident_TopEarner). Column (1) presents results from repeating our between group analysis, 
and Column (2) presents results from repeating our within-group analysis that includes year, 
state, firm, and manager fixed effects. t-statistics appear in parentheses and are based on standard 
errors clustered by state and year. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 
and 0.10 levels (two-tail), respectively. 
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Table IA.5  Differential Effect of Retroactively Applied Tax Rates 
 
 
Variable Coeff. t-stat 
ManagerRate 0.259*** (4.31) 
RetroActive*ManagerRate –0.130*** (–7.01) 
RetroActive 0.051*** (7.01) 
Time-Varying Controls:  
     Firm-level Yes 
     State-level Yes 
     Manager-level Yes 
Fixed Effects:  
     Year Yes 
     State Yes 
     Firm Yes 
     Manager Yes 
F / N / N(RetroActive = 1) 47.78 / 15,461 / 393 
 
 
 
This table presents results from estimation Eq. (9) after including: (i) an indicator variable equal 
to one if the state tax rate in year t was retroactive (RetroActive) and (ii) the interaction between 
the indicator and ManagerRate (RetroActive*ManagerRate). Regression specifications follow 
column (4) of Table 4. t-statistics appear in parentheses and are based on standard errors 
clustered by state and year. Sample of 393 firm-years affected by retroactive rates. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two-tail), respectively. 
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Table IA.6 Large and Small Increases and Decreases 
 
 
Variable Coeff. t-stat 
Lag Value   
ManagerRatet-1 0.246** (2.52) 
   
Increases   
ΔLg+ ManagerRatet 0.004** (2.22) ΔSm+ ManagerRatet  –0.001 (–0.45) 
   
Decreases   
ΔLg– ManagerRatet –0.003 (–1.50) ΔSm– ManagerRatet –0.001 (–0.90) 
Time-Varying Controls:  
     Firm-level Yes 
     State-level Yes 
     Manager-level Yes 
Fixed Effects:  
     Year Yes 
     State Yes 
     Firm Yes 
     Manager Yes 
F / N 42.08 / 15,461 
p-value test: ΔSm– ManagerRatet + ΔSm+ ManagerRatet = 0 0.80 
p-value test: ΔLg– ManagerRatet + ΔLg+ ManagerRatet = 0 0.74 
 
 
 
This table presents results from estimating Eq. (9) after decomposing ManagerRatet into its 
lagged value (ManagerRatet-1) and the change during the year (ΔManagerRatet) as follows: 
 
ManagerRatet = ManagerRatet-1 + ΔManagerRatet  
 
where 
 ΔManagerRatet = ΔLg+ ManagerRatet + ΔSm+ ManagerRatet  
  + ΔLg– ManagerRatet + ΔSm– ManagerRatet 
 ΔLg– ManagerRatet is the change in tax rate if it is less than –75 basis points; ΔSm– ManagerRatet 
is the change in tax rate if it is between–75 and zero basis points; ΔSm+ ManagerRatet is the 
change in tax rate if it is between zero and 75 basis points; and ΔLg+ ManagerRatet is the change 
in tax rate if it is greater than 75 basis points. Regression specifications follow column (4) of 
Table 4. t-statistics appear in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered by state and 
year. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two-tail), 
respectively. 
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Table IA.7 Timing Tests 
 
 
Variable Coeff. t-stat 
ManagerRatet 0.240*** (6.83) 
   
Lags   
ManagerRatet–1 –0.181 (–1.31) 
ManagerRatet–2 0.346 (1.39) 
ManagerRatet–3 0.216 (0.90) 
   
Leads   
ManagerRatet+1 0.008 (0.07) 
ManagerRatet+2 0.051 (0.52) 
ManagerRatet+3 –0.044 (–0.87) 
Time-Varying Controls:  
     Firm-level Yes 
     State-level Yes 
     Manager-level Yes 
Fixed Effects:  
     Year Yes 
     State Yes 
     Firm Yes 
     Manager Yes 
F / N 38.99 / 15,461 
 
 
 
This table presents results from estimating Eq. (9) after including three leads and lags of 
ManagerRatet (i.e., ManagerRatet–3, ..., ManagerRatet+3). Regression specifications follow 
column (4) of Table 4. t-statistics appear in parentheses and are based on standard errors 
clustered by state and year.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
levels (two-tail), respectively. 
 
